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Abstract
In recent years, the German capital market was shaken by scandals caused by
the insiders of public corporations like Comroad, Metabox, Infomatec, EM.TV
et al. The overall damages of the scandals generated in the Frankfurt Stock
Exchange's Neuer Markt are approximated to be close to 200 billion until the
market segment was nally closed down. The consequence of the nancial scan-
dals is, besides the causation of the tremendous damages to private investors, a
substantially spoiled reputation of the capital market itself, whereas the latter
adversities seem not yet to be absorbed completely. Even though the criminal
procedures in the mentioned cases leaded to the conviction of the responsible
insiders, the refurbishment of the scandals in German courtrooms frequently
left damaged investors without a remedy for their losses, thereby revealing the
jurisdiction's de lege lata limits. As far as noticed actually none of the damaged
investors' civil claims did yet succeed. A rst reaction to the corporate scandals
by the German regulator in the fourth capital market advancement act is widely
assessed to be insucient to amend investors' legal status eectively. The aim
of this analysis is to approach the rst best solution to minimize the total so-
cial costs of false capital market information. It furthermore contributes to the
continuing discussion in Germany about the reasons for the nancial scandals.
Moreover, it makes a contribution to the debate on the issue, whether the dam-
aging events indicate an advanced intervention of the government, and - if so -
in which fashion the legal rule should be developed to be an optimal remedy.
The capital market scandals are set o by false capital market information that
was intentionally or frivolously disseminated by Directors and Ocers (D&O)
of public corporations, which are in the German two-tier system Vorstand and
Aufsichtsrat. Hence, the impact that false material data have on the eciency of
capital markets will be addressed in detail. Its specic eect on the share price
is scrutinized by reviewing practical cases that occurred recently in Germany.
This might allow a deeper understanding of the dierent kinds of damages that
result from the approval of a frivolous disclosure policy by Board members. By
changing the perspectives the hypothesis that Board members have clear in-
centives to provide capital markets with false information will be veried. The
analysis will apply especially insights of Law & Economics - as well as from the
developing branch of Law and Behavioral Science - to emphasize the issue's dis-
cussion in traditional legal scholarship. Moreover, as economic theory indicates,
a reason for a government intervention is only given in cases of market failures.
Thus, the analysis will determine if the inecient allocation of investors' funds
and the related Pareto suboptimality is grounded on market failures. Especially
presumable obstacles with asymmetric information, negative externalities and
potential free riding-behavior by competitors appear worthwhile to focus on.From an economic perspective it is to discuss whether the damages of share-
holders that - due to false capital market information - purchased stocks above
their actual value, should be recoupable in general. The crucial aspect about
inuencing the process of disclosure with an eective liability rule is that it
could also hinder necessary and valuable truthful information to be available
for the market participants. As the economic approach to the law discerns
it as a tool to maximize social welfare, the analysis will check whether the
drafted German Kapitalmarktinformationshaftungsgesetz (KapInHag) is com-
plying with this prerequisite. It will focus on two aspects that appear crucial
for the eciency of the legal rule. First, the target of the drafted liability rule,
i.e. who should be held liable for the dissemination of false information will be
focused on. The traditional German liability regime that favors the primary re-
sponsibility of the corporation will be depicted and compared with the divergent
proposal of the KapInHaG. The main question will be, which liability system
provides the optimal setting of incentives for Board members. Second, as the
central aspect of a liability rule is the standard of fault that it comprises, it will
be analyzed in detail. The German lawmaker suggests in the drafted KapIn-
Hag a standard of \gross negligence". Thus, Board members will compensate
damaged investors in every case the court in its ex post evaluation will conclude
that the disclosure of false information was grossly negligent. The analysis will
examine in detail whether the proposal of the KapInHaG is pinpointing the ac-
curate level of deterrence, while assuring that the necessary information will be
disseminated courageously and at the perfect time. Therefore it will specially
utilize the Business Judgment Rule, an instrument of US corporate law that
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THE ECONOMICS OF D&O LIABILITY FOR FALSE INFORMATION  
IN GERMAN SECONDARY CAPITAL MARKETS
1 
 
§ 1. Introduction 
 
In  recent  years,  the  German  capital  market  was  shaken  by  scandals  caused  by  the  insiders  of  public 
corporations  like  Comroad,  Metabox,  Infomatec,  EM.TV  et  al.
2  The  overall  damages  of  the  scandals 
generated in the Frankfurt Stock Exchange’s Neuer Markt are approximated to be close to 200 billion € until 
the market segment was finally closed down.
3 The consequence of the financial scandals is, besides the 
causation of the tremendous damages to private investors, a substantially spoiled reputation of the capital 
market itself, whereas the latter adversities seem not yet to be absorbed completely. 
 
Even though the criminal procedures in the mentioned cases leaded to the conviction of the responsible 
insiders, the refurbishment of the scandals in German courtrooms frequently left damaged investors without 
a remedy for their losses, thereby revealing the jurisdiction’s de lege lata limits. As far as noticed actually 
none of the damaged investors’ civil claims did yet
4 succeed.
5 A first reaction to the corporate scandals by 
the German regulator in the fourth capital market advancement act
6 is widely assessed to be insufficient to 
amend investors’ legal status effectively.
7 
 
This  analysis  contributes  to  the  continuing  discussion  in  Germany  about  the  reasons  for  the  financial 
scandals. Furthermore, it makes a contribution to the debate on the issue, whether the damaging events 
indicate an advanced intervention of the government, and - if so - in which fashion the legal rule should 
developed to be an optimal remedy. 
 
The  capital  market  scandals  are  set  off  by  false  capital  market  information  that  was  intentionally  or 
frivolously
8 disseminated by Directors and Officers (D&O) of public corporations, which are in the German 
two-tier system Vorstand and Aufsichtsrat (Board of Management and the Supervisory Board – here jointly 
termed: Board).
9 Hence, the impact that false material data have on the efficiency of capital markets will be 
                                                 
1 This article has been accepted as a Master-Thesis in the Programme European Master of Law and Economics in October 2005 
(www.emle.org).  I  thank  Mrs. Prof.  Dr.  Michal  Gal  from  the  University  of  Haifa and  Mr.  Prof.  Dr.  Sharon  Hannes  from  the 
University of Tel Aviv for their supervision and for valuable suggestions while researching on this paper. Moreover I thank Prof. Dr. 
Hans-Bernd Schäfer, University of Hamburg, for the second expertise. 
2 A survey on the German homemade scandals in given by Ryan, Patrick S., "Understanding Director & Officer Liability in Germany 
for Dissemination of False Information: Perspectives from an Outsider". German Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 5, 2003, 439 et sqq. 
3 See Baums, ZHR 167 (2003), 139 et sqq. 
4 For instance the recent civil case of EM.TV, which still is not yet decided definitely. 
5 See Baums, ZHR 167 (2003), 139, 141. 
6 The so-called Viertes Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz. 
7 See Kieth, Kurt, Persönliche Organhaftung für Falschinformation des Kapitalmarkts – Anlegerschutz durch Systembruch?, DStR 
2003, p. 1982 et sqq; Holzborn, Timo/ Foelsch, Eberhard, Schadenersatzpflichten von Aktiengesellschaften und deren Management 
bei Anlegerverlusten, NJW 2003, p. 932, 937; Fleischer, Holger, Das Vierte Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz, NJW 2002, 2977, 2979. 
The mainly criticized aspects are that only the corporation is liable, but not the management and that the heavy burden of proof on 
the  investor  that  impedes  an  effective  protection.  Furthermore  see  an  overview  provided  by  Ryan,  Patrick  S.,  "Understanding 
Director & Officer Liability in Germany for Dissemination of False Information: Perspectives from an Outsider". German Law 
Journal, Vol. 4, No. 5, 2003, 449. 
8 Hence, the notion “false” will not necessarily indicate an intentional conduct of Board members. It refers also to frivolous acts that 
lead to the dissemination of objectively wrong information. 
9 The terminology “Board” will be used for both, the Vorstand and the Aufsichtsrat as long as the arguments are valid coevally. 
Necessary differentiations will be particularly indicated. A recent survey on the general duties of the German Vorstand is given by 
Turiaux, André/ Knigge, Dagmar, Vorstandshaftung ohne Grenzen? – Rechtssichere Vorstands- und Unternehmensorganisation als 
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addressed in detail.
10 Its specific effect on the share price is scrutinized by reviewing practical cases that 
occurred recently in Germany. This might allow a deeper understanding of the different kinds of damages 
that result from the approval of a frivolous disclosure policy by Board members. 
 
By changing the perspectives the hypothesis that Board members have clear incentives to provide capital 
markets  with  false  information  will  be  verified.  The  analysis  will  apply  especially  insights  of 
Law & Economics - as well as from the developing branch of Law and Behavioral Science - to emphasize 
the issue’s discussion in traditional legal scholarship. 
 
Moreover, as economic theory indicates, a reason for a government intervention is only given in cases of 
market failures. Thus, the analysis will determine if the inefficient allocation of investors’ funds and the 
related  Pareto  suboptimality  is  grounded  on  market  failures.  Especially  presumable  obstacles  with 
asymmetric  information,  negative  externalities  and  potential  free  riding-behavior  by  competitors  appear 
worthwhile to focus on. From an economic perspective it is to discuss whether the damages of shareholders 
that  - due  to  false  capital  market  information -  purchased  stocks  above  their  actual  value,  should  be 
recoupable  in  general.  The  crucial  aspect  about  influencing  the  process  of  disclosure  with  an  effective 
liability rule is that it could also hinder necessary and valuable truthful information to be available for the 
market participants. 
 
As the economic approach to the law discerns it as a tool to maximize social welfare, the analysis will check 
whether the drafted German Kapitalmarktinformationshaftungsgesetz (KapInHag)
11 is complying with this 
prerequisite. It will focus on two aspects that appear crucial for the efficiency of the legal rule. 
 
First, the target of the drafted liability rule, i.e. who should be held liable for the dissemination of false 
information will be focused on. The traditional German liability regime that favors the primary responsibility 
of the corporation will be depicted and compared with the divergent proposal of the KapInHaG. The main 
question will be, which liability system provides the optimal setting of incentives for Board members. 
 
Second, as the central aspect of a liability rule is the standard of fault that it comprises, it will be analyzed in 
detail. The German lawmaker suggests in the drafted KapInHag a standard of “gross negligence”. Thus, 
Board members will compensate damaged investors in every case the court in its ex post evaluation will 
conclude that the disclosure of false information was grossly negligent.  
 
The analysis will examine in detail whether the proposal of the KapInHaG is pinpointing the accurate level 
of deterrence, while assuring that the necessary information will be disseminated courageously and at the 
perfect time.
12 Therefore it will specially utilize the Business Judgment Rule, an instrument of US corporate 
law that might be worthwhile to implement also in German capital market law.  
 
                                                 
Instrument der Risikominimierung, DB 2004, p. 2199-2207. 
10  See  for  the  different  interpretations  of  the  Efficient  Capital  Market  Hypothesis,  Jennings/Marsh/Coffee/Seligman,  Securities 
Regulation
8th, Cases and Materials, p. 239 et sqq. 
11 The draft of the KapInHaG is available at http://www.wpk.de/pdf/wpk-stellungnahmen_kapinhag-diskussionsentwurf.pdf. (Acces-
sed on the 7.8.2005), as well as at BMF: Diskussionsentwurf eines Gesetzes zur Verbesserung der Haftung für falsche Kapitalmarkt-
information (Kapitalmarktinformationshaftungsgesetz – KapInHaG), NZG 2004, p. 1042-1051. 
12 Stout, Lynn A., "In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business 
Judgment Rule" (September 27, 2001). UCLA, School of Law Research Paper No. 01-21. http://ssrn.com/abstract=290938, p. 1, 8. 
6 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2006,  Paper 2
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2006/iss1/art2A. Reviewing Cases of False Information on the German Capital Market   
The aim of the analysis is to approach the first best solution to minimize the total social costs of false capital 
market information. 
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§ 2. Determining the Problem of False Information in Capital Markets 
 
A. Reviewing Cases of False Information on the German Capital Market 
 
The former Vorstand of Comroad - a firm that provided traffic navigation technology - publicly announced 
excessively high profits in the years 1999-2001
13 that should have been earned by trading with a Hong Kong 
based contractual partner named „VT Electronics“, which was actually not even existent.
14 The influence of 
the false ad-hoc disclosures that stated the valuable business with VT Electronics on the stock price was the 
basis for the seven years jail-term for the Vorstandsvorsitzenden
15 Mr. Bodo Schnabel. 
 
In another case in the year 2002, Metabox - a producer of set-top boxes that was to connect televisions with 
the internet - announced in ad-hoc disclosures various large orders from “abroad” with a value of over 250 
million  €.
16  The  market  processed  this  information  as  the  stock  price  of  Metabox  increased  by  22  % 
immediately after disclosure.
17 However, as investors recognized that these announcements were not realistic 
and that such deals would not occur at all, the value of the shares decreased sharply and Metabox finally 
filed for insolvency proceedings on August 30
th 2002. The court judged the false ad-hoc disclosures as 
fraudulent  and  convicted  the  former  Vorstandsvorsitzenden  of  Metabox  Mr. Stefan Domeyer  to  seven 
months of jail with probation.
18 
 
Moreover, another entity of the New Economy named Infomatec announced in 1999 the “biggest deal in the 
company’s history …”, based on a contract with the firm Mobilcom worth “at least 22,5 million €”.
19 In 
reality, the value of the contract was less than 4,5 million €. Interestingly enough, the stock price increased 
after  this  disclosure,  because  investors  traded  shares  increasingly  but  later  faced  serious  damages  when 
prices  declined  sharply  as  the  market  acknowledged  the  real  value  of  the  publicized  deal.  Infomatec’s 
insiders  stressed  that  they  did  not  intend  to  mislead  the  market  and  that  the  press  processed  their 
announcement wrongly as they had confused the notion “at least” with “up to”. This case of Infomatec exists 
on the border between intentional and grossly negligent disclosure of false information.
20 
 
In the case of EM.TV the CEO Thomas Haffa announced that “… (w)e stand entirely by our prognosis … 
business  is  going  very,  very  good  …  there  is  nothing  negative  to  report.”
21  This  information  was 
disseminated  even  though  the  entrepreneurial  setting  of  the  entity  was  constantly  downgrading  and  the 
promised earnings of 272 million $ in October 2000 only amounted to approximately 23 million $.
22 Mr. 
                                                 
13 Solely 1,4 % of the announced turnovers for the period January-April 2002 amounting to 93,6 million € have been actually 
achieved. See: http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/26386. (Accessed 200.07.2005) 
14 Available: http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/26386. (Accessed 20.07.2005) 
15 The Vorstandsvorsitzende is the German equivalent of the CEO in the US Corporation. 
16 Available: http://www.manager-magazin.de/geld/artikel/0,2828,135845,00.html. (Accessed 20.07.2005) 
17 Available: http://www.manager-magazin.de/geld/artikel/0,2828,135845,00.html. (Accessed 20.07.2005) 
18Avaiable:http://www.it-daily.net/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=698&mode=thread&order  =0&thold. 
(Accessed 20.07.2005) 
19  See  Ryan,  Patrick  S.,  "Understanding  Director  &  Officer  Liability  in  Germany  for  Dissemination  of  False  Information: 
Perspectives from an Outsider". German Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 5, 2003, 439, 454. 
20 Fleischer, Holger, Zur deliktsrechtlichen Haftung der Vorstandsmitglieder für falsche Ad-hoc-Mitteilungen – Zugleich eine Be-
sprechung der Infomatec-Entscheidungen des BGH vom 19.7.2004, DB 2004 S. 1928 -, DB 2004, p. 2031 et sqq. 
21 See Haffa-Brüder weisen Betrugsvorwurf zurück, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 5
th November 2002, p. 1. 
22 Ryan, Patrick S., "Understanding Director & Officer Liability in Germany for Dissemination of False Information: Perspectives 
from an Outsider". German Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 5, 2003, 439, 454. 
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Haffa still asserts that he never intended to cause damages and that he disclosed prospected earnings in the 
year 2000 in good faith whose amounts were actually achievable. Even though Mr. Haffa’s affirmations 
appear quite unbelievable,
23 there are cases easily conceivable in which statements indeed are made in good 
faith. As the nature of prognoses is that they are about the forecast of uncertain future incidents, they might 
turn out to be wrong, notwithstanding the fact that the prognosis itself was legitimate. 
 
B. Efficient Capital Markets and False Information 
 
I. The Impact Of False Information on the Share Price 
 
To analyze the impact of false information on the share price, one has to examine the preconditions of a 
well-developed securities market. Following the common definition, an efficient securities market requires 
perfect  information  of  all  market  participants,  an  immediate  reception  of  new  available  data  and  a 
marketplace with small and numerous participants.
24 The Efficient Market Theory (EMT) asserts that if the 
former prerequisites are met, the stock price is determined by a discounting process such that it equals the 
discounted value - i.e. the present value - of expected future cash flows.
25 
 
If this description of an efficient market is correct, there could not be obstacles with a derogating influence of 
false information on the share price. As all participants would have perfect information, the incorrectness of 
the capital market news would be included in the price of the share just at the time of its disclosure. Under 
this condition a divergence between the corporation’s discounted intrinsic value and its present market value 
is impossible. However, this depiction does not explain the response of the investors who took the false 
corporate news of e.g. EM.TV’s or Comroad’s insiders for granted and purchased overpriced shares before 
the sudden downswing occurred. 
 
The  German  capital  market  scandal  unveils  that  the  condition  of  accessibly  accurate  information  has 
pragmatically not been achieved and remains merely a theoretical notion. The real investor’s losses can only 
be identified as the damage that occurs because of the gap between the market value and the intrinsic or real 
value of an enterprise. Due to false and extremely positive information, investors trustfully equate the market 
value  with  the  real  entrepreneurial  value  of  an  enterprise  thus  trading  in  overpriced  shares.  If  the  new 
corporate data emerges on the market, revealing that the previous data have been false, the gap closes, 
whereby investors indeed face tremendous losses as the share price declines sharply. 
 
This observation is consistent with the semi-strong Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH), which 
central to the EMT. It stresses that share prices adjust instantaneously and in an unbiased fashion to publicly 
                                                 
23  Indeed  the  criminal  case  led  to  the  conviction  of  Thomas  and  Florian  Haffa,  see  the  judgment, 
http://www.dasanwaltsbuero.de/fp_files/urteile/bgh_1_str_420-03.pdf.  
24 Fama, Eugene F./ Jensen, Michael C./ Roll, Richard, The Adjustment of Stock Prices To New Information, International Economic 
Review, Vol. 10, February, 1969; Reprinted in Investment Management: Some Readings, J. Lorie and R. Brealey, eds., Praeger 
Publishers,  1972;  and  Strategic  Issues  in  Finance,  Keith  Wand,  ed.,  Butterworth  Heinemann,  1993.  Available  at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=321524, p. 2. Fama states furthermore that news have to arise randomly in the future, so that markets remain 
relatively unpredictable. 
25 Fama, Eugene F./ Jensen, Michael C./ Roll, Richard, The Adjustment of Stock Prices To New Information, International Economic 
Review, Vol. 10, February, 1969; Reprinted in Investment Management: Some Readings, J. Lorie and R. Brealey, eds., Praeger 
Publishers,  1972;  and  Strategic  Issues  in  Finance,  Keith  Wand,  ed.,  Butterworth  Heinemann,  1993.  Available  at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=321524, p. 2. 
10 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2006,  Paper 2
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2006/iss1/art2B. Efficient Capital Markets and False Information  11 
available new information, so that no excess returns can be earned by trading on that information.
26 Hence, 
the semi-strong ECMH argues that all public available information - no matter if correct or false (but at least 
plausible) - will formate the actual share price. The strong ECMH emphasizes the former approach and 
asserts that literally every information - even the publicly unknown - is incorporated the share price, so that 
in every moment the stock’s market price is reflecting the intrinsic value of the enterprise. According to the 
strong ECMH there cannot be a difference between the market and the intrinsic value of an enterprise. 
 
But a closer look reveals that the power of the ECMH is to refuse. A frequently occurring small gap occurs 
between the investment value and the actual entrepreneurial value, which is a fundamental precondition of a 
functioning capital market. This follows the “efficiency paradox”, which affirms that an operative capital 
market cannot be perfectly efficient, because a certain grade of informational intransparency is necessary to 
assure participants’ incentive to obtain and process information in general.
27 This phenomenon refers to the 
fact that gathering information is costly and will be neglected by market participants if a positive return from 
the  advantage  of  superior  knowledge  is  not  obtainable.
28  Hence,  a  functioning  market  economy  is  not 
characterized by perfect information but a certain combination of knowledge and nescience.
29 Clearly, these 
earnings would be impossible in a perfectly efficient market, in which every participant possesses perfect 
information. In practice, functioning capital markets face cycles of nearly perfect efficiency followed by 
relative inefficiency, because participants defer the pricey quest for new data as profits from such activity 
fade, but at a later term continue the search for new information as markets become more inefficient and so 
allow a positive return from the acquisition of unknown data.
30 
 
As can be derived from previous observations, the share price is determined by an indispensable divergence 
between the corporate intrinsic- and its market value, following a necessary degree of intransparency of 
information. The basic problem with false information is indeed that it is creating the mentioned gap without 
being essential for the basic functioning of capital markets. It creates a reduction of efficiency that is not 
required  for  in  providing  incentives  to  quest  and  process  capital  market  information.  Therefore  this  is 
superfluous and has to be identified as an obstacle for investors and capital markets at large. 
 
The visible result of this obstacle in the market is that investors who rely on the accurateness of the disclosed 
information will decide to purchase securities although the market price is actually too high and does not 
reflect the lower intrinsic value of the corporation’s shares. The share price is influenced by too optimistic 
information or the not disclosed not good - but realistic information - about the issuer’s situation in it’s given 
market. If, as in case of the capital market scandal, the disclosed information is eventually evaluated and 
proven to be false, the perceptive semi-strong ECMH indicates that market participants will quickly process 
false information as well. This will trigger an abruptly decreasing share price and has frequently initiated it’s 
                                                 
26 An instructive formulation is given by Grossman, Sanford J., On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, University 
of Pennsylvania - Finance Department; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), December 19080, NBER Working Paper 
No. R0121, also available at http://papers.ssrn.com /sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id = 228054, p. 2.: “ If competitive equilibrium is 
defined as a situation in which prices are such that all arbitrage profits are eliminated, is it possible that a competitive economy 
always be in equilibrium? Clearly not, for then those who arbitrage make no (private) return from their (privately) costly activity. 
Hence the assumptions that all markets, including that for information, are always in equilibrium and always perfectly arbitraged are 
inconsistent when arbitrage is costly.”  
27 See Jennings/Marsh/Coffee/Seligman, Securities Regulation
8th, Cases and Materials, p. 241. 
28 Jennings/Marsh/Coffee/Seligman, Securities Regulation
8th, Cases and Materials, p. 240, 241. 
29 Schäfer/Ott, Ökonomische Analyse des Zivilrechts, p. 424; Merkt, Hanno, Unternehmenspublizität: Offenlegung von Unterneh-
mensdaten als Korrelat der Marktteilnahme, Tübingen, 2001, p. 210. 
30 Jennings/Marsh/Coffee/Seligman, Securities Regulation
8th, Cases and Materials, p. 241.; Merkt, Hanno, Unternehmenspublizität: 
Offenlegung von Unternehmensdaten als Korrelat der Marktteilnahme, Tübingen, 2001, p. 210. 
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own dramatic crash. 
 
Hence the common and aphoristic definition of an efficient capital market whose prices fully reflect all 
corporate data that is available
31 is correct as far the notion of “available” refers to new, publicly announced, 
correct or false or misleading capital market information. For market efficiency at large, as well as for 
investors, the latter unpredictably have a negative impact on share price formation. 
 
II. The Negative Effects of False Information on the Capital Markets 
 
The eventually explored falsehood of capital market information will lead to two severe negative effects, 
which strike at the private level of investors’ assets and at the public interest concerned with an optimally 
conditioned capital marketplace. 
 
1. Private Losses of Investors that rely on the Information’s Accurateness 
 
The first is to be seen on a micro level: investors might face painful damages while possibly losing their 
investments in total. This is especially bitter, if like in the US’ Enron case the shares are the basis of the 
employee’s pension funds, of which these people’s future living standard is depending on.
32  
 
2. Inefficiencies of Capital Markets due to Investors’ lower Commitment 
 
The second effect is linked to the first one and to be observed on the macro level: the false information 
causes inefficiencies in secondary
33 capital markets and thereby diminishes its overall size. 
 
A  basic  concern  of  the  market  economy  is  to  allocate  it’s  limited  capital  efficiently.  Private  funds  are 
supposed to be invested in companies with businesses whose ideas are expected to bring high returns, and to 
withdraw from companies with poor prospects.
34 Thus, if private assets are invested in those companies that 
are most valuable to the national economy, then the capital is being used efficiently. This condition identifies 
investments that lead, a sufficient level of security, at the same time to the potentially highest return on 
investment for shareholders. Thus, if the capital market is efficient, then invested funds will gain the optimal 
most possible yield. The instrument utilized in order to achieve this target is mainly to obtain wide and 
detailed information for investors about the possibilities of diverse investments in general
35 as well as for 
                                                 
31 Gilson, Ronald J./ Kraakman, Reinier, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, Columbia 
Law  and  Economics  Working  Paper  No.  240;  Stanford  Law  and  Economics  Olin  Working  Paper  No.  270;  Harvard  Law  and 
Economics Disc. Paper No. 446 Also available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id =462786. 
32 For an analysis of US scandals, Ribstein, Larry Edward, "Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002". Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 28, No. 1, 4 et sqq. 
33 The secondary market has to be delineated from the first capital market. Basically the first market refers to the emission of new 
shares by the public corporation. This usually occurs in the IPO or when a increase in share capital is performed. The differences 
between the markets make also differing liability regimes necessary. This analysis will focus only on the secondary capital markets, 
in which investors trade stock among themselves. See for the delineation of the two markets, see Baums, Theodor, Mittelständische 
Unternehmen und Börse – Eine rechtsvergleichende Betrachtung, Festschrift für Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker zum 70. Geburtstag, p. 
816;  Schwark,  Eberhard,  Kapitalmarktbezogene  Informationshaftung,  Festschrift  für  Walther  Hadding  zum  70.  Geburtstag  am 
8.Mai 2004, p. 1116, 1138. 
34 Wurgler, Jeffrey, Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital, NYU Stern School of Business; National Bureau of Economic 
Research  (NBER),  July  1999,  Yale  IFC  Working  Paper  No.  99-08.  Available  at  http://papers.ssrn. 
com/paper.taf?abstract_id=171921, p. 3. 
35 Fleischer, Holger, Verhandlungen Des Vierundsechzigsten Deutschen Juristentages, Berlin 2002, Band I, p. F 38. 
12 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2006,  Paper 2
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2006/iss1/art2C. Incentives of Board Members to Disseminate False Information  13 
chances  and  risks  of  a  specific  investment.
36  In  this  fashion,  society  allocates  its  resources  toward 
investments that promise the greatest return and steers away from less promising firms. This will improve the 
allocative efficiency of the resources’ utilization and will ideally achieve “Pareto optimality”, in which no 




If available information is false, the allocative function of the market is abrogated.
38 Then the assets will not 
be invested in the best performing company that has optimistic future prospects, but in the one that has been 
cheating while at the same time providing the “best” information. When stock investors purchase stocks, 
they are exchanging cash for a promised future return. The disappointment of asserting that this promise has 
not been kept, leads to a fundamental distrust in the market itself. Investors will have paid too much for 
inferior shares, thereby consequently losing faith in the capital market at large and will increasingly invest 
their funds in other sources such as bonds or traditional savings. Consequently, a strong capital market will 
only  enhance  efficiency  if  the  private  and  institutional  investors  evolve  sufficient  faith  in  the  fairness, 
stability and integrity of the market.
39 
 
Nevertheless, if potential investors mistrust the market because of frequent wrong or misleading information 
by the Board, the national economy will - due to inefficiencies – undergo major losses.  
 
Especially  in  the  German  economy  there  is  a  steady  undersupply  of  fresh  stockholder’s  equity.
40  Even 
though the second capital market has no direct link to the IPO-market in a way that companies directly profit 
from a higher stock price, nonetheless the lost faith in secondary markets fires back to the initial market of 
new shares and decreases the chances of corporations to raise funds by going public. Capital costs are on the 
rise, and if investors lose faith in buying stocks they will not differentiate between new and old shares. They 
will just refuse to participate in this type of investment. Hence it follows that growth of the economy through 
financing companies with stockholder’s equity is inefficient and thereby is unequivocally improvable. 
 
C. Incentives of Board Members to Disseminate False Information 
 
I. Entrepreneurial Reasons for the Dissemination of False Information 
 
There are entrepreneurial grounds as to why members of the Board might tend to provide the capital market 
with  false  information.  This  argument  is  based  on  the  contiguous  fact  that  Board  members  are  highly 
motivated, occasionally conceited, corporate professionals who want to be in charge of what is considered to 
                                                 
36 Lenenbach, Kapitalmarkt- und Börsenrecht, Fn. 1.40. 
37 Loss, Louis/ Seligman, Joel Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, 4
th Edition, p. 920, 921. 
38 A detailed survey on the allocation of capital in financial markets is provided by Wurgler, Jeffrey, Financial Markets and the 
Allocation  of  Capital,  NYU  Stern  School  of  Business;  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research  (NBER),  July  1999,  Yale  IFC 
Working Paper No. 99-08. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=171921. 
39 Black, Bernard S., The Legal and Institutional Preconditions For Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781 2000-2001, p. 
781, 783. 
40 Baums, Theodor, Mittelständische Unternehmen und Börse – Eine rechtsvergleichende Betrachtung, Festschrift für Ernst-Joachim 
Mestmäcker zum 70. Geburtstag, p. 816; see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, An International Relations Perspective on the Convergence of 
Corporate Governance: German Shareholder Capitalism and the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) European Union, 
1990-2000. ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 06/2003; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 406. p. 9. Unlike in the 
US, stocks have been not so common in private investors portfolios in Germany. Things are undergoing a change while large 
corporations like the Deutsche Telekom and Deutsche Post published a huge amount of shares in the market, called misleadingly 
“Volksaktien” (“people’s shares”) and thereby downplaying the inherent risk of trading stocks. 
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be a successful company and will adjust their decision making tactics according to that goal. 
 
Frequently, Board members have an interest in high market capitalization of the employing enterprise. The 
market capitalization is expanding with both, a higher share price and an increase in share capital, whereas 
the latter is facilitated when the share price is at a relatively high level. Hence, negative news about the 
enterprise’s market performance will decrease the share value and impede on higher market capitalization. 
To avoid this scenario, managers could take the bait and suppress or euphemize negative capital market 
information. 
 
Decidedly, members of the Vorstand have in their day-to-day decision-making, situations in which high 
market  capitalization  is  advantageous  so  as  to  achieve  aimed  targets.  For  instance,  the  decision  about 
conditions for a bank credit will be indirectly influenced by the stock price of the owing enterprise. A high 
market capitalization signals successful entrepreneurship as well as a solidly, durable, market participation. 
Consequently the creditor might reduce interest rates due to a lower risk of default in back-payment. Since 
the management wants to reduce credit costs, it is possible that prior to entering into negotiations about 
obtaining credit, information that could negatively influence the share price will not be announced to the 
capital market. 
 
Circumstances are comparable when management seeks to finance its expansion through bonded capital. The 
costs of corporate bonds depend on the company’s credit status that is assessed by rating agencies such as 
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s or Fitch.
41 The lower the rating are by the agencies, then the higher the interest 
rates are for the company to discharge in order to sell bonds on the market. To give an example of the power 
of  the  rating  agencies’  appraisal,
42  as  ThyssenKrupp  was  downgraded  one  step  to  a  moderately 
weak/ marginal “BB+”-rating, the annual costs of their bonds increased by 20 million €.
43 The assessment 
criteria for the rating comprise - besides a detailed analysis of the financial status -
44 a general assessment of 
the quality of management. As an analyst of the third largest rating agency, Fitch stresses, the Board’s 
performance will also be reviewed according to the share value at the date of the appraisal.
45 Therefore, 
important rating partly depends on the stock price, which the Board members can influence by a selective 
disclosure  of  value-relevant  information.  This  observation  identifies  another  aspect  that  might  lead  the 
management to engage in disclosure policies that finally might not be a picture of the current entrepreneurial 
setting of the company 
 
Furthermore, the threat of a hostile takeover by competitors fosters the Board’s affinity to mind a high value 
of  the  stocks
46  as  well  as  the  disposition  to  avoid  its  decline  by  disseminating  false  price  information 
influences  into  the  market.  In  a  competitive  and  well-functioning  capital  market,  competing  companies 
permanently expose other public corporations to risk a bid for a takeover. There is coherence between poor 
management performance and share price. The worse the market assesses the quality of management, the 
more investors will sell. In this case, fewer investors will buy stocks so that supply will outweigh demand 
                                                 
41 For details see moody’s.com, standardandpoors.com, fitchibca.com. 
42 See detailed Müller, Mario, Die zweite Supermacht, Frankfurter Rundschau, 19.7.2003, p.12. 
43 http://www.wertpapier.de/nest/index.php?render=artikel&art=111 (Accessed 24.7.2005) 
44 For instance long-term lending, pension funds obligations, whether M&A transactions are depth financed etc. 
45See the  online  interview  with  an  employee  of  the  French  rating  agency  Fitch:  http://216.239.59.104/search?q= 
cache:S49r_Jr4O1YJ:www.gtnews.com/capitalmarkets/creditratingsguide5.cfm+Moody%27s+Rating+Agency+Criteria+&hl=de. 
(Accessed 24.7.2005) 
46 Schäfer/Ott, Lehrbuch der ökonomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts, 3
rd Ed., p. 602. 
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and the prices will decline. Consequently, the opportunity for a takeover bid increases as well as the Board’s 
risk to be dismissed by the new majority owners of the corporation. Therefore the threat of abrogation 
and - this should not be underestimated - fear of a flawed reputation as an unsuccessful corporate manager in 
the public opinion will create an incentive to prevent a hostile takeover.
47 A means to circumvent passage of 
title; this is possible merely for a short period of time - is to manipulate investor’s opinions by announcing 
false news that holds up or increases stock prices. 
 
II. Motivational Biases aggravate the Disclosure of False Information 
 
Research in the branch of Law and Behavioral Science has shown that human decision-making is influenced 
by motivational biases. The recovering of these human dispositions has clarified many Law & Economics’ 
insights, because the movement traditionally applied - thinner or thicker -
48 interpretations of rational choice 
theory  that  led  to  predictions,  which  intelligibly  deviated  from  the  actual  human  process  of  decision-
making.
49 To explain Board members’ aptness to supply capital markets with false information even though 
they do not intend to do it, analyses of Law and Behavioral Science provide helpful insights. 
 
The German capital market scandals revealed that from an investor’s perspective, the most interesting and 
for that reason prominently recognized information are predictions of an enterprise’s future performance. 
Even though retrospective (un)-consolidated financial statements
50, (un)-consolidated management reports
51 
in compliance with section 325 Commercial Trading Act (HGB)
52 or interim reports according to section 
40 Exchange Act (BörsG)
53 are providing detailed information about the issuers past market participation,
54 
the  current  reports
55  according  to  section  15 Securities  Trading  Act  (WpHG)
56  and  especially  plain 
statements of Board members in the news(-papers) that are not regulated de lege lata, will significantly 
influence the financier’s investment decision.
  
 
The  “confirmatory”  or  “self-serving”  bias  is  justifying  the  conjecture  that  especially  the  publicly  most 
recognized  predictions  about  entrepreneurial  future  performance  can  be  systematically  too  positive  and 
misguide potential investors to purchase overpriced shares.
57 The “self-serving” bias generally leads actors to 
                                                 
47 Buchta, Jens, Die Haftung des Vorstands einer Aktiengesellschaft – aktuelle Entwicklungen in Gesetzgebung und Rechtsprechung 
(Teil II), DStR 2003, p. 740, 743. 
48 As rational choice theory is used in the law-and-economics scholarship, it is understood alternatively as a relatively weak, or “thin” 
presumption that individuals act so as to maximize their expected utility, however they define this, or as a relatively strong, or “thick” 
presumption  that  individuals  act  to  maximize  their  self-interest.  See  for  details,  Korobkin,  Russel/  Ulen,  Thomas,  Law  and 
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, California Law Review, Vol. 88, 2000, also 
available at http://papers.ssrn. com/paper. taf?abstract_id=229937, p. 5. 
49 Korobkin, Russel/ Ulen, Thomas, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 
California Law Review, Vol. 88, 2000, also available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract _id= 229937, p. 6 et sqq. 
50 In German: Einzel- und Konzernabschlüsse. 
51 In German: Einzel- und Konzernlageberichte. 
52 In German: Handelsgesetzbuch. 
53 In German: Börsengesetz. 
54 In fact the Lagebericht also provides an outlook of the prospected development. Usually it nonetheless is only evaluated and 
assessed by professional market analysts.  
55 In German termed as Ad-hoc Meldungen. 
56 In German: Wertpapierhandelsgesetz. 
57 A good summary of this bias is provided by Van den Steen, Eric, Skill or Luck? Biases of Rational Agents, MIT Sloan Working 
Paper Series, June 2002, p. 3; Farnsworth, Ward, The Legal Regulation of the Self-Serving Bias, Boston University School of Law, 
Working  Paper  Series,  Public  Law  &  Legal  Theory,  Working  Paper  No.  02/07,  p.  2  et  sqq.  Also  available  at 
http://www.bu.edu./law/faculty/papers. 
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a perception of information, which is approving their preconceived beliefs.
58 Moreover actors frequently 
interpret information in ways that serve their own interests. These self serving biases can lead managers to 
provide objectively wrong information, even though they are not aware of it: empirical research has shown 
that  people  generally  overestimate  their  skills  in  - and  their  contribution  to -  courses  of  action  they  are 
concerned with.
59 If one transfers this general observation to the subject of corporate disclosure, one might 
assert that Board members, as they are personally committed to a projected business venture, occasionally 
process in-house data concerning the probability of success in a not strictly rational manner.  
 
Primarily, Board members might overestimate their managerial prowess
60 and thus have an overoptimistic 
prior opinion about their ability to succeed.
61 Hence they often might downplay hints that indicate obstacles, 
just because  they truly and adamantly belief in their own expertise. Secondly, as far as the company’s 
prosperity  reflects  the  interest  of  the  Board  members,  they  might  process  pessimistic  information  too 
positively or might just unconsciously suppress bad news because it does not fit into their concept of targeted 
success. Central to this theory is a mechanism that leads endogenously to an agent being relatively overly 
optimistic about the likelihood for success of her own actions. This phenomenon of human decision-making 
might set off an overly optimistic assessment of future corporate performance and will therefore necessarily 
influence  the  quality  of  disclosed  information  that  is  circulating  into  capital  markets.  Due  to  this 
“confirmatory” or “self-serving” bias, investors will get information as to upcoming business projects that 
will not correctly indicate the actual risk of the investment, while underestimating the probability of a flop 
for the venture. 
 
Moreover, to scrutinize the exhaustive, motivational predispositions one has to refer to the “over-confidence 
bias”. Numerous studies support, even when actors are acquainted with the actual probability of a particular 
unwanted event to occur, their predictions as to the likelihood that the event will happen to them is going to 
be underestimated.
62 This bias is grounded on the general belief of decision makers that good incidents are 
more likely than average to happen to them then bad ones. Going forward with the issue of false information, 
they will be too prone to believe in the success of the project even though they might process the data 
concerning the probability of failure correctly. Thus, the “over-confidence bias” refers to the fact that Board 
members  over-estimate  the  accuracy  of  their  estimates  and  predictions,  of  which  they  themselves  are 
occasionally overly optimistic. 
 
To sum it up, immoderate confidence in the ability of “their” enterprises to overcome obstacles and the self-
serving perception of information that might objectively signal future problems could lead Board members to 
                                                 
58 Korobkin, Russel/ Ulen, Thomas, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 
California Law Review, Vol. 88, 2000, also available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf? abstract_id=229937, p. 43. 
59 See Babcock, Linda/ Loewenstein, George, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self Serving Biases, The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 109- 126. The “above average effect” shows that managers are also overly optimistic 
concerning their managerial prowess. 
60 Larwood and Whittaker, 1977. (1977) ’Managerial myopia: self-serving biases in organizational planning,’ Journal of Applied 
Psychology, Vol. 62, pp. 194-198. 
61 Larwood and Whittaker, 1977. (1977) ’Managerial myopia: self-serving biases in organizational planning,’ Journal of Applied 
Psychology, Vol. 62, pp. 194-198; Babcock, Linda/ Loewenstein, George, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self Serving 
Biases, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 109- 126. This bias can refer to a disposition of people who see 
themselves as having a greater than average share of some desirable quality. E.g., most drivers consider themselves above average in 
their level of skill behind the wheel, while almost nobody thinks they are below average in their ability to get along with others. 
62 Korobkin, Russel/ Ulen, Thomas, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 
California Law Review, Vol. 88, 2000, also available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf ?abstract_id=229937, p. 43 et sqq. For 
instance, even though the divorce rate is about 50 %, young couples will tend to assess the risk of getting divorce close to 0 %, see 
Van den Steen, Eric, Skill or Luck? Biases of Rational Agents, MIT Sloan Working Paper Series, June 2002, p. 7. 
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- unintentionally - mislead those who would invest in their securities. 
 
 
III. Board Members are Holding Shares 
 
Especially in the New Economy, the members of the Board purchased shares of the company they founded or 
worked for. Since one condition of the capital market bubble in 1999 and following years was that the share 
price in the IPO was usually significantly below the first listed market price and that Board members could; 
different from outside investors; assure attaining shares through the procedure of public offering. So, very 
often they purchased stocks for their own private portfolios. Secondly, in the frequent cases in which the 
Board members were also the company’s founders, usually they have been convinced of the chance to make 
profits on their business ideas so that Board members have preferred to hold shares in their “own” company. 
 
This observation reveals an important endeavor of Board members’ to enhance the share price. The holding 
of one’s own shares provides the incentive to influence the market by disseminating information that triggers 
trade  and  thereby  increases  the  market  value  of  the  stock.  To  increase  the  share  price  in  the  already 
mentioned scandals, insiders sometimes purposefully or frivolously - but in good faith and in the hope that 
the prediction will finally come true, have publically announced false information. 
 
To exemplify the argument one can refer to the EM.TV case. The Vorstand of EM.TV Mr. Thomas Haffa 
was - very likely - against the best of his knowledge convincing the market of a prosperous future of the 
entity - the share price increased sharply - so that shortly after announcing the false information his sale of 
200.000 shares gave him private gains of approximately 20 million €.
63 In the following the prospected gains 
had to be corrected down to a much lower level.
64 The market got suspicious and the share price broke down 
from 115.50 € in early 2000 to 6.75 € in December of the year. EM.TV’s “high-speed crash”
65 left numerous 
private financiers with major damages that lost trust in the capital market and might not again invest in the 
capital market. 
 
The EM.TV case shows that the sole fact that Board members are holding shares offers an incentive to 
disclose false information to secondary capital markets. This finding of course does not imply that Board 
members who hold own shares will always be prone to disclose false information about the enterprise to 
make extra profits, but the incident can contribute to a netting of incentives that will be examined deeper in 
the following example. 
 
IV. Stock Options as a Compensation Model 
 
Just as the holding of shares, as well as partial payment through Stock Options can trigger incentives for the 
Vorstand  (Board  of  Management),
66  this  can  result  in  providing  potential  share  traders  with  false 
                                                 
63 Ryan, Patrick S., "Understanding Director & Officer Liability in Germany for Dissemination of False Information: Perspectives 
from an Outsider". German Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 5, 2003, 462. 
64  See  Ryan,  Patrick  S.,  "Understanding  Director  &  Officer  Liability  in  Germany  for  Dissemination  of  False  Information: 
Perspectives from an Outsider". German Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 5, 2003, 439, 454.  
65 EM.TV’s high-speed crash, The Economist, 7 December 2000 
66 In Germany the legitimacy of compensating the Aufsichtsrat (Supervisory Board) with Stock Options is disputed among scholars. 
The  German  High  Federal  Court  (BGH)  recently  judged  (II  ZR  316/02 - 16.02.2004 – BGHZ  158,  122)  that  members  of  the 
Aufsichtsrat are not allowed to take part in Stock Option-plans. Even though there is one way to grant the Supervisory Board with 
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information. 
 
The central claim of the Shareholder-Value-Approach is to govern an enterprise according to the objectives 
of the shareholders and not to primarily regard the interests of other stakeholders such as the employees.
67 In 
the Shareholder-Value-Discussion Stock Options have been implemented to increase the stock price and by 
this  means  serving  the  shareholders’  interests.
68  This  instrument  is  useful  in  linking  parts  of  the 
management’s salary to price advancements of shares. The obligees of the Options will have the incentive to 
align their acts to a progression of the enterprises’ value in the capital market.
69 The economic reason behind 
Stock Options is to abate the agency costs of management, i.e. costs to limit the extent to which managers of 
public corporations place their own interests above those of their shareholders.
70 
 
While the use of Stock Options has been widespread in the US for a long time, this trend is emerging in 
Europe in recent years.
71 In Germany, there is a progression to observe in the application of Stock Options. 
Already  more  than  half  of  the  enterprises  that  are  listed  in  the  Deutsche Aktienindex (DAX) utilize  this 
compensation scheme. Some established and influential German enterprises that use Stock Options as part of 
their variable salary are Siemens, DaimlerChrysler,
72 Deutsche Bank, Puma, Continental, BHF Bank and 
Henkel.
73 In addition to their ability to attenuate the Principal-Agent-Conflict, Stock Options can be assessed 
as  a  useful  remuneration  scheme  because  they  burden  the  enterprise’s  liquidity  less  than  classic 
compensation does and at the same time reduce the personnel costs.
74 These previous functions can be seen 
as an explanation for the increasing use of this instrument in German capital markets. 
 
Nonetheless, despite the fact that Stock Options align incentives of members of the Board of Management 
and shareholders, they thereby outplay the Principal-Agent obstacle of moral hazard, which is the same fact 
that creates problems for dissemination of capital market information. Stock Options are providing Board 
members  with  the  incentive  to  undertake  endeavors  towards  increasing  share  prices.  As  a  negative 
appendage,  the  Options  promote  an  inducement  to  disclose  false  information  about  the  company’s 
performance, so that the managements’ Stock Options will also increase their value.
75 Thus, with the focus 
on their own salary, management could be inclined to disseminate information that clearly draws on the 
enterprise’s market performance in an excessively positive light so that the share price increases or at least 
                                                 
Options, this has not yet been decided upon by the cout. For instance, combining the Option-plan with the so-called Wandel- and 
Optionanleihen, it is quite likely that this compensation model will totally be excluded from the Supervisory Board. See details in 
Röhricht, Volker, Die aktuelle höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung zum Gesellschaftsrecht, p. 12 et sqq. are mostly granted to the 
Vorstand of various enterprises. However, it has not been excluded to pay the Aufsichtsrat through a variable compensation element, 
as well. See Kessler/Sauter-Babel, Handbuch Stock Options, marginal number 41, 174. 
67 See, good examples such as, Gordon, Jeffrey N., What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business 
Corporation:  Some  Initial  Reflections,  Univ.  of  Chicago  Law  Review,  also  available  at  http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=305343; 
Kessler/Sauter-Babel, Handbuch Stock Options, marginal number 3 et sqq. 
68 See Achleitner/Wichels, Stock Options, p. 2. 
69 See Semmer, Repricing – Die nachträgliche Modifikation von Aktienoptionsplänen zugunsten des Managements, p. 15 et sqq. 
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Michigan Law Review, Dec 2003, Vol. 103 Issue 3, p. 331, 339. 
71 Kessler/Sauter-Babel, Handbuch Stock Options, marginal number 1, 2. 
72  Since  2005  on,  the  Board  of  Management  of  DaimlerChrysler  is  not  paid  in  Stock  Options  any  more.  See 
http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,368197,00.html, (Accessed on the 4.8.2005). 
73 Feddersen/Pohl, p. 26. 
74 See Ribstein, Larry Edward, "Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
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will not decline. By the same the token, it is also possible that Board members will disclose information that 
is too negative, or hold back positive news to keep down share prices. This is likely to occur shortly before 
new Options will be granted.
76 Since the value of the Stock Option depends on the difference between the 
strike price and the actual price at the date of exertion, the management has an interest to get the Option 
granted at the lowest strike price that is achievable. So, it is possible that the management might (mis-) use 
capital market information to perpetuate its interests. 
 
From the perspective of potential investors, false information could mislead purchase of shares at a price that 
is above the real value
77 or the sell of shares at a too low of a price when in reality, it’s actual value is well 
above that. But this adheres to the fact that the motivation described of the Vorstand or Aufsichtsrat will not 
lead to regular and persistent wrong information for potential investors, while the vast majority of Option 
obligees will dispute the mentioned temptation to not steal investors’ money. Still, one has to assert that a 
clear aptitude is created by Stock Options. This proneness to disclose false company news is closer fortified 
through granting new or exerting expiring Stock Options. 
 
One can generally claim that the enhanced utilization of Stock Options among German public corporations 
creates  a  double-edged  sword  as  they  mitigate  the  Principal-Agent-Conflict  and  save  agency  costs,  yet 




                                                 
76 See Yermack, David, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements, J. of Finance, Vol. 52 No. 
2, June 1997, abstract available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=8189. (Accessed 24.7.2005) 
77  Investors  that  already  have  shares  could  profit  from  the  increased  market  price,  but  will  not.  First,  shareholders  lack  the 
information that there is a gap between the value and the price of the share and secondly, they don’t know when to sell the shares, so 
that they probably will hold onto it until the falsehood about the information is revealed. Hence they will also undergo losses. 
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§ 3. The Necessity of Government Intervention to Cope with False Information 
 
The  question  as  to  whether  the  obstacles  caused  by  false  information  in  capital  markets  require  the 
lawmaker’s intervention has long been debated, notwithstanding that there is no unitary answer, especially 
from stakeholders. 
 
In the US, the Council of Economic Advisors, in its discussion of a capital market law reform in the 2003 
Economic Report of the President, agnostically stated that “whether SEC-enforced disclosure rules actually 
improve the quality of information that investors receive remains a subject of debate among researchers 
almost 70 years after the SEC’s creation.”
78 A basic insight in capital market law is that over-regulation can 
be just as damaging as under-regulation. Jennings/Marsh/Coffee are posing the correct question: ”Initially, 
however, there is an antecedent question: why regulate?”
79 
 
This question leads to a theory of regulation, which in its normative part deals with problems of market 
failure.
80 An approach to this theory refers to economist’s search for Pareto Efficient markets, in which the 
allocation of society’s scarce resources is optimal and the agent who most values the resource will achieve 
it.
81 In the case of market failures this prerequisite has not yet been accomplished, due to problems, which 
are  outside  the  range  of  Smith’s  invisible  hand,  that  assure  the  Pareto  Efficient  equilibrium  in  perfect 
competitive markets. But regulation is only an efficient tool if markets are not able to help themselves and, 
probably even more importantly, if it does not create a greater damage than it should prevent.
82 The problem 
is addressed by the “Nirvana-approach” that reminds us of the fact that government intervention is not a 




Since it is practically impossible to compute the damages, the approximation of the private losses and market 
deficiencies require a deeper knowledge about the factors that influence their extension. Thus, the question to 
pose is, actually how effective are the market forces? 
 
As already pointed out, several arguments give reason that Board members have the tendency to provide 
capital markets with false information either on purpose or unintentionally. If market forces would be able to 
embank this tendency effectively, a costly legal remedy would be superfluous. But if the capital market alone 
can  not  affect  the  damaging  impact  on  private  investors  and  market  efficiency  as  explained  above,  the 
implementation of a legal remedy might appear to be reasonable. Hence, it is arguable whether a securities 
market that faces the problem of false information can be characterized by a failure that market forces cannot 
themselves correct.  
 
A. Asymmetric Information in Secondary Capital Markets 
                                                 
78 See http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy04/pdf/2003_erp.pdf, p. 96, 97. 
79 Jennings/Marsh/Coffee/Seligman, Securities Regulation, Cases and Materials, 7
th Ed., p. 1. 
80 Baums Theodor, Changing Patterns of Corporate Disclosure in Continental Europe: the Example of Germany, European Corporate 
Governance Institute, ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, October 2002, p. 2, 3 et sqq. 
81 Cooter/ Ulen, Law and Economics, 4
th Ed., p. 16, 17. 
82 According to the content of the KapInHaG suspicious, Semler/ Gittermann NZG 2004, p. 1081. 
83 Schäfer/Ott, Lehrbuch der ökonomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts, 3
rd Ed., p. 466; Demsetz, H., Information and Efficiency: 
Another View Point, Journal of Law and Economics, Issue 12, 1969, p. 1 et sqq. 
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A puzzling fact is that investors disburse enormous amounts of private funds to a “strange” corporation for 
shares that are entirely intangible rights, and whose value depends mostly on the quality of the information 
that the investors receive based on the companies’ truthfulness.
84  
 
Moreover, investors are unable to scrutinize the quality of shares before the purchase, so the latter are not 
search goods. However, whether the satisfactory performance of shares after the purchase is the result of a 
good management or just due to general positive market development can frequently not at all or only be 
judged at high information cost. Since securities are not experience goods either, they are credence or -
trust goods, whose actual performance does not allow an assessment of future quality attributes. Thus, in the 




As the credence good character of securities provides very limited possibilities for potential investors to 
assess  the  adequateness  of  the  share  price,  there  is  a  fundamental  problem  of  the  different  levels  of 
knowledge  about  the  company’s  situation  in  its  market  among  outsiders  and  well-informed  insiders. 
Generally the imbalance of information between parties to an exchange can be so significant that exchange is 
impeded. Severe asymmetries can disrupt the market so much that the Pareto Efficient optimum will not be 
achieved  by  voluntary  exchange  of  information.




Applying this insight of economic theory, one can derive that a prudent financier will just make securities 
investments if he has reliable information about the primary credibility and the later abidance of the given 
plights.
88 The peculiarity of information asymmetry on secondary capital markets is that actually neither the 
seller nor the buyer has the necessary information to assess the quality and the price of the shares. Potential 
investors and sellers depend on third party dissemination of information that allows scrutinizing the value of 
shares. Hence, financiers are primarily dependent on the revelation of data by the company’s insiders, who 
are members of the Board. Besides the confidence that company’s insiders won’t cheat investors out of most 
- or even out of all of the value of their investment through self-dealing, is the announcement that credible 




However, when market failure is apparent, the intervention of lawmakers in the market can ideally correct 
information asymmetries and induce an advanced, efficient and enhanced flow of information. The sole fact 
that  asymmetric  levels  of  information  characterize  the  secondary  capital  market  is  occasionally  seen  as 
sufficient to justify government intervention.
90  
 
                                                 
84 Black, Bernard S., The Legal and Institutional Preconditions For Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781 2000-2001, p. 
781, 782. 
85 Fleischer, Holger, Verhandlungen Des Vierundsechzigsten Deutschen Juristentages, Berlin 2002, Band I, p. F 23. 
86 Cooter/ Ulen, Law and Economics, 4
th Ed.,p. 47, 48. 
87 Schäfer/Ott, Lehrbuch der ökonomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts, 3
rd Ed., p. 472, 473. 
88 Fleischer, Holger, Verhandlungen Des Vierundsechzigsten Deutschen Juristentages, Berlin 2002, Band I, p. F 23. 
89 Black, Bernard S., The Legal and Institutional Preconditions For Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781 2000-2001, p. 
781, 782. 
90 Baums Theodor, Changing Patterns of Corporate Disclosure in Continental Europe: the Example of Germany, European Corporate 
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But there might be a remedy for this market failure that also has its sources in forces that are powered by the 
market itself. The question is, whether the market can generate for the Board members’ an incentive to quasi 
voluntarily provide potential financiers with sufficient and correct material data. 
 
B. Agency Cost-Theory/ Application of the Principal-Agent-Problem 
 
As a remedy for the market failure of asymmetric information between investors and insiders of public 
corporations, one could apply an argument supporting the existence of incentives for the company’s insiders 
to deliberately disseminate truthful information. This argument can be derived from the agency-cost theory
91 
and basically stands against the call for government intervention. 
 
The initial point of the idea is the contractual connection between the shareholders (principals) and the Board 
members (agents). This principal-agent relationship induces agency costs that are the sum of the monitoring 
expenditures by the principal, the bonding expenditures by the agent and the residual loss.
92 The incentives 
of both principals and agents to minimize agency costs can have a positive impact on the quality and quantity 
of disclosed corporate data, therefore alleviating asymmetric information. 
 
The  separated  control  over  the  publicity  of  entrepreneurial  decision-making  and  ownership  of  public 
corporations creates obstacles since the interests of principals and agents differ.
93 Shareholders want the 
Board to adopt decisions that maximize profits and therefore value shares. These decisions inevitably involve 
a certain degree of risk that only managers, being the most informed party, can estimate ex ante. By the same 
token, Board members might exploit the information asymmetry shareholders undergo by adopting post-
contractual opportunistic behavior aimed at the maximization of their personal utility to the detriment of 
shareholders’ interests. 
 
Thus,  the  principal-agent  relation  includes  a  hazard  that  agents  will  behave  rationally  self-serving  and 
deprive  shareholders  of  their  enterprises’  value.  The  monetary  equivalent  of  the  reduction  in  welfare, 
experienced  by  the  principal  as  a  result  of  this  obstacle  is  also  a  cost  of  the  agency  relationship  that 
Jensen/ Meckling
94  refer  to  as  the  residual  loss.  But  characteristics  of  the  relationship  also  provide 
shareholders with the ability to control the risk of a too high residual loss and to embank on the opportunistic 
behavior of Board members.  
 
As  can  be  shown,  shareholders  can  induce  agency  costs  by  discounting  the  share  price  and  coevally 
contribute to mitigating the market failure of asymmetric information.  
 
Many shareholders or –prior to purchase - numerous potential financiers have the power to influence the 
share price. If the management perceivably acts opportunistically, that includes also intentionally publicizing 
                                                 
91 See Jensen, Michael C./ Meckling,William H., Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 
Journal of Financial Economics, October, 1976, V. 3, No. 4, p. 305-360. Also Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=94043. Moreo-
ver, Merkt, Hanno, Unternehmenspublizität: Offenlegung von Unternehmensdaten als Korrelat der Marktteilnahme, Tübingen, 2001, 
p. 212, 213.  
92 Jensen, Michael C./ Meckling,William H., Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 
Journal of Financial Economics, October, 1976, V. 3, No. 4, p. 305-360. Also Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=94043, p. 5, 6; 
Schäfer/Ott, Ökonomische Analyse des Zivilrechts, p. 594, 600. 
93 Cooter/ Ulen, Law and Economics, 4
th Ed., p. 139, 140. 
94 Jensen, Michael C./ Meckling,William H., Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 
Journal of Financial Economics, October, 1976, V. 3, No. 4, p. 305-360. Also Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=94043, p. 6. 
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false information, shareholders will increasingly sell their stocks, whereas potential capital providers will 
refrain from purchasing the company’s stocks - they will preferably invest in another enterprise - so that the 
price declines. Actually a similar mechanism applies to the unintended disclosure of false information. After 
the market becomes aware of the disclosed information‘s falsehood, the share price will decline, because the 
discounted  future  profits  of  the  corporation  that  are  included  in  the  price  diminish  with  the  sobering 
knowledge about the company’s real prospects.
95  
 
As market participants lose faith in the Board members that have applied frivolous disclosure politics or even 
shown opportunistic behavior, there will be an additive reduction of the share price. Financiers will consider 
the risk that the Board again might abstain from serving their interest in the future and impound it onto the 
price. As a remedy for the risk of managerial self-dealing, shareholders and potential investors will embank 
on the above mentioned peril by discounting the share price down to the level that they believe the losses 
caused by the agency costs will do to damage them. 
 
The agents on the other hand will have an incentive to diminish agency cost, i.e. to avoid discounts on share 
prices. Board members have an interest to avoid offering a discounted stock price.
96 The main reasons being 
the frequent equation of managerial expertise and increasing stock prices
97 as well as the higher risk of a 
hostile takeover
98 that might leave them behind and unemployed with a blemished reputation. Consequently, 
insiders have a psychological interest and an economic advantage in satisfying the agent’s perceptions and 
thus will try to meet them. Thus, this theory provides for the threat of high agency costs that give Boards the 
incentive to act favorably towards potential investors and shareholders.  
 
By signaling that the interests of the shareholders are seriously taken into entrepreneurial consideration by 
the Board points out that this party has it in its own hands involved to reduce the discount on stock price and 
to minimize agency cost. An effective tool is to comply with disclosure policies that are not opportunistic 
and  avoid  blatant  mistakes  in  the  announcements.
99  Hence,  Boards  have  an  incentive  to  report  to  the 
shareholders that they are driven by efforts to maximize shareholder value. This indeed includes also the 
truth as to the disseminated data so that insiders will disclose both good and bad news of their performance. 
Also  the  latter,  because  markets  would  become  suspicious  if  only  positive  performance  was  frequently 
revealed which would typify the company as being a “sunshine-publisher” which could cause a question of 
trust. Conclusively, a loss of faith after acquaintance with falsehood could lead to even higher agency costs. 
 
To sum this up, the inefficiencies in secondary capital markets due to the market failure of asymmetric 
information can be embanked by the agency cost-theory. But it is questionable as to whether the deterring 
forces of shareholder “retaliation” are effective enough to actually solve this problem. It presumes that there 
exists “rational ignorance” of every single investor as to it’s own contribution not being able to influence the 
                                                 
95 For details as to price formation see, Fama, Eugene F./ Jensen, Michael C./ Roll, Richard, The Adjustment of Stock Prices To New 
Information, International Economic Review, Vol. 10, February, 1969; Reprinted in Investment Management: Some Readings, J. 
Lorie and R. Brealey, eds., Praeger Publishers, 1972; and Strategic Issues in Finance, Keith Wand, ed., Butterworth Heinemann, 
1993. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=321524, p. 2.  
96 Merkt, Hanno, Unternehmenspublizität: Offenlegung von Unternehmensdaten als Korrelat der Marktteilnahme, Tübingen, 2001, p. 
212. 
97 Cooter/ Ulen, Law and Economics, 4
th Ed., p. 140. 
98 Schäfer/Ott, Lehrbuch der ökonomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts, 3
rd Ed., p. 602. 
99 For instance the confusion of “at least” and “at max.” while referring to the value of a contract in the case of Infomatec. Details are 
provided for, See Ryan, Patrick S., "Understanding Director & Officer Liability in Germany for Dissemination of False Information: 
Perspectives from an Outsider". German Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 5, 2003, 439, 454. 
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behavior of the indeed powerful Board that weakens this theoretical consideration. Moreover the “thin” 
market for corporations that impedes frequent takeovers
100 of suboptimally managed corporations is counter-
productive  and  allows  Board  members  to  deviate  from  the  shareholders’  ideal  without  suffering 
“punishment”. 
 
Hence, to allow market forces to have a free-hand, will not entirely correct the market failure of asymmetric 
information; thus governmental intervention appears indicated. 
 
C. The Problem of Adverse Selection 
 
There is another obstacle to well functioning of the secondary capital market that is related to the apparently 
persistent asymmetric information. The fact that Board members possess exceptional knowledge about inside 
materials facilitates a source for inefficiencies that are termed adverse selection. 
 
This concept has been explored by Akerlof
101 who observed the used car market to exemplify this problem of 
market distortion. His basic findings are that buyers do not know whether the cars offered are - as Akerlof 
phrases it - “lemons” (bad cars) or “cherries” (good vehicles), their willingness to pay lies between the price 
for lemons and cherries.
102 Thus, sellers will trade fewer cherries since they consider the price to be too low, 
but will sell a higher number of lemons as they can get a good price for them. After some time, purchasers 
realize the undesireable quality, and refuse to pay the old price for used cars, as they are still unable to 
evaluate the quality of the car. The price will lower and even fewer cherries, and even more lemons, will be 
put up for sale. Using an extreme, the cherry sellers will have been driven, as it were, out of business.
103  
 
Used cars and securities are comparable in a way that they are both not search goods. Their quality can 
hardly be assessed ex ante of the purchase. From the perspective of consumers, securities are even worse to 
scrutinize than used cars, as one ex post will find numerous influencing effects that have determined the 
market performance of the share, while a mechanic will easily find the reason, for instance why the brakes of 
a car are malfunctioning. Thus, used cars are experience goods whereas securities are - as already stated – 
rather  in  the  category  of  credence  goods.  Against  this  background  it  is  worthwhile  to  apply  Akerlof’s 
observation to the securities market. 
 
The result of asymmetric information between public corporations and potential investors is that the latter do 
not know whether they are about to purchase costly shares that are actually of high quality and worth their 
price.  Usually  this  problem  is  seen  from  the  perspective  of  consumers  who  lack  information.  But  the 
obstacles also are apparent in the case of disseminated information that is false. Due to tampered material, 
data  investors  are  misled  and  will,  as  they  realize  this  by  facing  losses,  lose  faith  in  the  corporation’s 
management and - as the scandals in Germany have shown - also in the market at large.
104 Thus, they will 
discount the share price of all market participating public corporations, including accurately managed ones. 
                                                 
100 Cooter/ Ulen, Law and Economics, 4
th Ed., p. 140, 141. 
101 Akerlof, Q. J. Econ. 84 (1970), p. 488. 
102 Akerlof, Q. J. Econ. 84 (1970), p. 488. 
103 Akerlof, Q. J. Econ. 84 (1970), p. 488. 
104 In the year 2000 151 corporations had their IPO in the Neuer Markt, where the volume of the emissions amounts to 29,2 billion €. 
However, in 2001 only 18 corporations went public where a volume of emissions amounted only to 2,97 billion €. Hence the number 
of IPOs has declined significantly due to deterred investors. See www.ipo-reporter.de/w6/stat.asp. (Stand 15.10.2001) and Ostrowski/ 
Sommerhäuser, WPg 2000, S. 961. 
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These circumstances result in the same problem of adverse selection: 
 
Potential financiers might search for a compromise between the handicap of being relatively uninformed 
about the management’s quality and - on the other hand - the fact that typically a higher price signifies higher 
quality. Accordingly, there is a tendency that investors will not be willing to purchase shares in the highest 
price segment and are more active in a medium segment. This leads to fewer sales of highly priced stocks. 
Supplier of these stocks will suffer from the buyers’ reluctance to purchase at the price that their stocks are 
actually  worth,  because  they  have  good  management  that  does  not  disseminate  false  capital  market 
information  to  influence  share  prices.  These  corporations  might  refuse  to  go  public,  because  they  are 
probably able to bargain better conditions when the growth is dept financed or they will be driven out of the 
market and will be forced to go private again. But corporations that have less than rewarding prospects are 
not deterred by the negative development of prices, as for them the average market price reflect their real 
value so that these firms will still go public. In a later period, the market will adjust to a lower level so that 
even lower quality shares will be traded. At the same time, the discounted price will not discourage dishonest 
issuers. The Boards of these firms will see an advantage to going public. This increasingly worsens market 
consistency  of  its  participants.  Akerlof’s  market  for  lemons  is  identifiable  in  secondary  capital  markets 
whereas the adverse selection constantly exacerbates. 
 
Equivalent to the granting of guarantee and warrants in the used car market, there are singalling devices that 
allow  the  Board  to  inform  the  market  about  its  honesty  and  the  priority  that  is  given  to  maximize  the 
shareholder value. These tools will make it easier for potential investors to separate “lemon-” from “cherry”-
corporations, so that divergent share prices that are related to the signaled quality can be achieved. 
 
One of the possibilities for corporations to signal their quality is to reacquire their own stocks, i.e. the issuing 
company buys its own shares on the market.
105 The signal to the market is that the Board of the issuing 
corporation believes that the shares on the market are undervalued, so the purchase is a profitable business.
106 
Other times, companies do this to prepare for the implementation of performance-based compensation plans 
for employees, for instance to serve Stock Options.
107 Rather than receive cash, the recipient would get an 
asset.
 The background of the reacquisition of it’s own stocks signals that entrepreneurial prospects surpass 
what market participants estimate them to be. The Board would face serious difficulties with uncompensated 
employees - and a personal loss - if all the granted Stock Options would be “out-of-money” at the time of 
exertion. Hence the reacquisition of own stocks is a relatively credible signaling device. 
 
But in Germany the reacquisition of own stocks has tight restrictions. The reason for these restrictions are 
mainly the risk of the buyback that leads to a partial liquidation of stockholders’ equity, which only the 
apparent shareholders are benefitting from.
108 Thus the jurisdiction allows the application of this instrument 
only in exceptional cases. But it is useful to attenuate the problem of adverse selection, because in cases of 
hardship it can be used to signal trust towards the market and to sustain the share price. Nonetheless it faces 
restrictions, for good reasons that are not mentioned here in detail, which impede the buyback to become a 
                                                 
105  A  detailed  description  for  the  reacquisition  of  stocks  (Aktienrückkauf)  is  provided  for  by  Hirte,  Heribert, 
Kapitalgesellschaftsrecht, 4. Auflage, Köln, 2003, p. 238 et sqq. After buyback (repurchasing), the company can either retire their 
shares or hold onto the shares for later resell. As the total quantity of shares decline, due to the amount of outstanding stocks in the 
open market being reduced, the shortage will trigger the rise in the price. 
106 Hirte, Heribert, Kapitalgesellschaftsrecht, 4. Auflage, Köln, 2003, p. 238 et sqq. 
107 Zätzsch, Roger/ Maul, Silja, Beck’sches Handbuch der AG, p. 294, 295. 
108 Zätzsch, Roger/ Maul, Silja, Beck’sches Handbuch der AG, p. 295. 
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more effective tool to cope with asymmetric information in public corporations. 
 
D. Externalities Caused by the Disclosure of False Corporate Data  
 
Another failure that preserves serious distortion of markets is termed “externality”. From the perspective of 
welfare economics the identification of an externality legitimates a legal rule that coerces or allows the actors 
to internalize the negative respectively positive effects of their conducts.
109 
 
In economic theory a negative externality occurs when a decision causes costs to stakeholders other than the 
actor making the decision.
110 In other words, the decisionmaker does not bear all of the costs that her action 
causes. Thus, she will also not consider them while accomplishing a Cost-Benefit-Analysis to assess the 
economic sensibility of her conduct. As a result, in a competitive market, there will be too high a level of the 
damaging activity that has caused the failure. Due to the unbargained for cost caused by the externality, the 
market is characterized by Pareto inefficiencies.
111 The remedy for externalities is to force the damaging 
agent to internalize the effects of the conduct, i.e. make her take into account the cost she is creating for 
others. This is usually accomplished by legal regulations that levy a tax on the injuring party or that create 
the duty to compensate the claimant.  
 
Brought forward by the obstacles with false information in secondary capital markets, there is a negative 
externality to identify what causes the mentioned effects. As businesses have different options to finance 
their endeavors, there are dept or equity financed funding methods that are applicable. Frequently employed 
to achieve liquid financial resources are bank loans and - for corporations – shareholder- or private equity 
options. The cost of the financial instrument have a major influence on the entrepreneurial decision, of which 
modus operandi is utilized. From the perspective of the enterprise, the instrument that entails the lower 
capital cost is superior. Capital costs are the expenses for the provision of funds, which are mainly the 
interests for a credit and the costs of the offering procedure, plus possibly unsold shares in an IPO.  
 
The new shares created in IPOs or in an increase in capital are preferably placed in bull markets, because in 
these situations the probability is higher that all new shares will be sold above their nominal value. Since the 
total nominal value of the sold shares will found in the actual corporation’s equity, firms are seeking to 
minimize the risk to sell (some of) the offered new shares below the nominal value or even not at all. Indeed, 
this would increase the capital cost significantly relative to dept-financed funds. Thus, the capital costs will 
be lower as the targeted amount of equity will be accomplished. 
 
The problem of false information in capital markets is that investors lose not only faith in the disseminating 
company  but  also  in  the  integrity  and  accurateness  of  the  market  at  large.  They  will  conduct  lower 
commitment and restrain from purchasing shares, so that a longer lasting bear market will occur, as could be 
seen  in  German  capital  markets  in  the  years  2000-2002.
112  The  capital  market’s  size  will  diminish,  as 
financiers invest their funds preferably in other financial instruments that provide save - but also probably 
                                                 
109 Cooter/ Ulen, Law and Economics, 4
th Ed., p. 44. 
110 Schäfer/Ott, Ökonomische Analyse des Zivilrechts, p. 366. 
111 Loss, Louis/ Seligman, Joel Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, 4
th Edition, p. 920, 921. 
112 In the year 2000 151 corporations had their IPO in the Neuer Markt, the volume of the emissions amount to 29,2 billion €. But in 
2001 only 18 corporations went public at a volume of emissions amounting only to 2,97 billion €. Hence the number of IPOs 
declined  significantly  due  to  the  deterred  investors.  See  www.ipo-reporter.de/w6/stat.asp.  (Stand  15.10.2001)  and  Ostrowski/ 
Sommerhäuser, WPg 2000, S. 961. 
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lower - returns at a lower risk. Thus, not only the capital cost of the disseminating firm will increase but also 
from all other corporations that are in the market. The company that is providing flawed news about it’s 
market  performance  will  thereby  cause  negative  externalities
113  on  other  enterprises  that  are  seeking  to 
supply the need of equity on the capital market, as well.  
 
The other companies will be carrying the not compensated for increasing capital cost, because of the overall 
lower commitment of investors in the securities market. A suggested remedy is a legal rule that forces the 
disseminating firm to take the costs into account. This can be achieved by an effective liability rule. 
 
E. Free Riding Behavior of Market Participants in Cross Section Analyses 
 
Finally  an  application  of  a  traditional  economic  argument  indicates  the  general  need  of  regulating  the 
disclosure of material data. Recent research shows that public corporations that disclose information are 
creating positive externalities to their peer.
114 
 
In  the  terms  of  economic  theory,  capital  market  information  is  a  public  good.  This  is  related  to  two 
characteristics that determine the commodity. Firstly, capital market information is defined by its partial 
nonexludability.
115 The corporate data is disseminated to convince potential financiers to invest their funds in 
the disseminating corporation. Thus, this information has to be available to investors at very low search 
cost.
116 This necessity implies that once the information is available to investors, it is practically impossible 
to  exclude  competing  firms  that  will  make  professional  use  of  the  data.  Secondly,  the  consumption  of 
information is nonrivalrous. If investors ground their decision on this information, they do not leave less of it 
for competitors of the corporation that will utilize it. In view of that, there is a strong inducement for peer 
firms of the privately provided public to obtain good information for a free ride. 
 
The discerning observation is that free riding behavior is apparently problematic in cross section analyses.
117 
These analyses are the analytical comparison of specific market participants by underwriters or potential 
investors to assess the value of competing firms in different branches. Cross section analyses are crucial for 
the efficiency of capital markets and increasing share prices.
118 
 
If a firm discloses, it affords the conditions for cross section analyses in the market, of which every single 
peer will benefit. But the disclosing firm will totally not be compensated, whereas the competitors will free 
ride on a fraction of the benefits, since their performance will also be comparable in the following. Therefore 
one can derive from this thesis that the overall supply of information will be too low, because the incentive 
to disclose is malfunctioning due to the peer’s free riding behavior.
119 
 
                                                 
113 Cooter/ Ulen, Law and Economics, 4
th Ed., p. 45. 
114 Hannes, Sharon, Comparison Among Firms: (When) Do They Justify Mandatory Disclosure?, 29 J. Corp. L. 699, 2003-204, p. 
699, 702. 
115 Cooter/ Ulen, Law and Economics, 4
th Ed., p. 46, 47. 
116 Jennings/Marsh/Coffee/Seligman, Securities Regulation
8th, Cases and Materials, p. 239 et sqq. 
117 Hannes, Sharon, Comparison Among Firms: (When) Do They Justify Mandatory Disclosure?, 29 J. Corp. L. 699, 2003-204, p. 
699 et sqq. 
118 Hannes, Sharon, Comparison Among Firms: (When) Do They Justify Mandatory Disclosure?, 29 J. Corp. L. 699, 2003-204, p. 
699, 717. 
119 Hannes, Sharon, Comparison Among Firms: (When) Do They Justify Mandatory Disclosure?, 29 J. Corp. L. 699, 2003-204, p. 
699, 717. 
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Thus, according to this approach there is a steady undersupply of information, because information is costly 
and the investors or peers who use it will not pay for it. Therefore, they are free riding on the information 
cost of the disclosing company. It will only supply information until it’s own marginal information costs are 
equal to the marginal benefit it expects from providing it. This can be judged as less information for a 
complete evaluation of the risks that the purchase of a specific share is providing. 
 
This argument states that the market itself is not able to provide the optimal of disclosure, so that a legal rule 




The  incentives  to  reduce  agency  costs  are  not  sufficient  to  remedy  the  obstacles  with  asymmetric 
information. Even though signaling devices can embank the adverse selection, the aptness of Board members 
to  disseminate  false  information  is  not  effectively  solved.  Moreover,  enterprises  that  disclose  false 
information are causing negative externalities on other public corporations. Conclusively, the peers of a 
disseminating firm might free ride on it’s information cost to thereby trigger a reduction of the overall 
quantity of information that is necessary for an efficient capital market. 
 
A mandatory law that regulates the quantity and the quality of capital market can embank mistakes in the 
process of disclosure and might thereby prevent painful damages. The practical experiences with the German 
corporate scandals are revealing that market failures indicate a need for state regulation to enhance the 
allocative efficiency of the capital market. 
 
In order to give a full evaluation of this task, one also has to take into account the cost a managerial liability 
rule would create in total. These costs can be tremendously high
120 and the cost-benefit-analysis might reveal 
that the damages in an unregulated market are lower than in a regulated one. Consequently, to approximate 
the  regulation  cost,  the  following  question  is  how  the  optimal  legal  rule  is  designed  to  cope  with  the 
obstacles of false capital market information by Board members. 
 
 
                                                 
120 See, the Economist, May 21
st –27
th 2005, A price worth paying?, p. 73, stating that the private cost of the US’ Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act might cause private cost to 1.4 trillion $. 
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§ 4. The Optimal Legal Remedy – An Approach to the Efficient Liability Rule 
 
Probably  the  most  inventive  approach  to  traditional  legal  scholarship  has  been  that  Law & Economics 
applied the principles of microeconomic price theory to the analysis of legal rules.
121 The application of the 
theory is founded on the insight that people basically act rationally and adjust their decisions to prevailing 
incentives.
122 The law has within it’s scope to make socially unwanted behavior costly to the addressees of 
the rule, while attaching a deterring price, i.e. a fine or a claim of compensation to this type of conduct. Thus, 
a suggested legal rule creates a mechanism that deters the decisionmakers of disseminating wrong statements 
on behalf of the public corporation while inventing or improving investors’ rights to compensation for losses 
that will occur. 
 
This is a fundamental task of this analysis, since it must appraise that the optimal law has to balance two 
important issues in one legal rule: firstly, it shall effectively deter the Board members to provide the capital 
market with false information, however at the same time it has to make sure that the relevant material 
information is made available to the market, so that the value of the investment can be accurately judged by 
potential investors. 
 
This  analysis  will  scrutinize  German  jurisdiction  and  therefore  will  focus  on  the  drafted 
Kapitalmarktinformationshaftungsgesetz (KapInHaG) that shall reform the German liability system for false 
information in secondary capital markets. Furthermore the optimal standard of care is going to be analyzed 
from an economic perspective. The further prerequisites of a liability rule such as, which data is in the rule’s 
scope, how is the notion of causation
123 and recoupable damages
124 are to be interpreted, will be examined in 
another survey. 
 
The  development  of  Germany’s  capital  market  liability  law  has  proceeded  over  decades
125  and  lacks  a 
superordinated dogmatic, in which the drafted KapInHaG can systematically fit in. Thus a brief overview 
about the German liability rules for disseminating false capital market data law is provided. 
 
A. The legal framework in German Capital Market Law 
 
I. The Situation de lege lata 
 
1. Section 37 b, c Securities Trading Act (WpHG) 
 
As a primary reaction to the scandals in German secondary capital markets, the lawmaker has enacted a 
- highly disputed -
126 legal remedy in the fourth capital market advancement act:
127 if investors face damages 
                                                 
121 Korobkin, Russel/ Ulen, Thomas, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 
California Law Review, Vol. 88, 2000, also available at http://papers.ssrn.com /paper.taf?abstract_id= 229937, p. 2. 
122 Mankiw, Grundzüge der Volkswirtschaftslehre, 3. Edition, p. 7. 
123 See for instance, Fleischer, Holger, Zur deliktsrechtlichen Haftung der Vorstandsmitglieder für falsche Ad-hoc-Mitteilungen –
 Zugleich eine Besprechung der Infomatec-Entscheidungen des BGH vom 19.7.2004, DB 2004 S. 1928 -, DB 2004, p. 2031, 2034. 
124 E.g., Leisch, Franz Clemens, Vorstandshaftung für falsche Ad-hoc-Mitteilungen – ein höchstrichterlicher Beitrag zur Stärkung 
des Finanzplatzes Deutschland, ZIP 2004, p. 1573, 1578. 
125 For an instructive overview see Ryan, Patrick S., "Understanding Director & Officer Liability in Germany for Dissemination of 
false Information: Perspectives from an Outsider". German Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 5, 2003, 439, 447. 
126 Gerber, Olaf, Die Haftung für unrichtige Kapitalmarktinformationen – Zugleich eine Besprechung der BGH-Entscheidungen vom 
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because of false ad-hoc announcements, the corporation has to compensate the financiers’ losses according 
to section 37 b, c WpHG.
128 Currently, there is no personal liability of Board members that has been enacted. 
 
In German scholarship the rule is judged to be quite ineffective for different reasons. Indeed, the claim is a 
blunt sword when the public corporation has no funds and goes bankrupt.
129 This has actually happened in 
the  cases  of  Infomatec,  Metabox  and  Biodata,  in  which  the  investors’  legitimate  claims  are  finally 
completely worthless.
130 A further point of criticism is that the claim is applicable only on false ad-hoc 
announcements.  These  are  current  reports  according  to  section 15 WpHG,  which  refer  to  data  that  can 
influence  the  share  price  extensively  and  therefore  have  to  be  disclosed  immediately.  Even  though  the 
protection of ad-hoc disclosure is a central issue, frequently there is a call for a general clause that copes with 
the issue.
131 The drafted KapInHaG steers a middle path and emphasizes the claim of the WpHG, personally 
and contently. It creates a direct claim against Board members and is applicable for almost every false 
announcement that is disseminated on behalf of the corporation. De lege lata, states that shareholders do not 
have  a  right  at  all,  when  the  disclosed  information  is  not  an  intentionally  disclosed  false  ad-hoc 
announcement. 
 
2. Rights of Shareholders against Board Members for Disclosure of False Data 
 
The private liability of Board members for damages of investors is de lege lata in Germany based solely on 
the tort system. 
 
a) Section 826 Civil Code (BGB)
132 
 
This  claim  according  to  section  826  BGB  requires  an  intentional  and  immoral  damnification  of  the 
tortfeasor.
133 The German High Federal Court (BGH)
134 judged that the manipulation of a market with malice 
aforethought is a breach of basic principles of capital market law.
135 Purposeful false information that are 
tempting the damaged party to an action, i.e. to buy or sell securities, are adjudicated to be immoral in the 
sense of section 826 BGB.
136  
 
b) Section 823 II BGB with “protective laws” 
 
Section 823 II BGB is a general provision that provides for the award of damages to plaintiffs if another 
                                                 
19.07.2004 „Infomatec“, DStR 2004, p. 1793, 1794; Rössner, Michael-Christian/Bolkart, Johannes Rechtliche und verfahrenstakti-
sche Analyse des Vorgehens geschädigter Anleger bei fehlerhaften Unternehmensmeldungen, WM 2003, p. 953. 
127 The Viertes Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz. 
128 A detailed survey, especially on the economic impact on the computing of damages, on section 37 b, c WpHG is provided by 
Escher-Weingart, Christina/ Lägeler, Alexander/ Eppinger, Christoph, Schadenersatzanspruch, Schadensart und Schadensberechnung 
gem. §§ 37 b, c WPhG, WM 2004, p. 1845-1896. 
129 Gerber, Olaf, Die Haftung für unrichtige Kapitalmarktinformationen – Zugleich eine Besprechung der BGH-Entscheidungen vom 
19.07.2004 „Infomatec“, DStR 2004, p. 1794. 
130 Baums, ZHR 167 (2003), 139, 141  
131 Hopt, Klaus/ Voigt, Hans-Christoph Prospekt- und Kapitalmarktinformationshaftung – Recht und Reform in der Europäischen 
Union, der Schweiz und den USA -, WM 2004, p. 1802. 
132 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. 
133 Edelmann, Hervé, Haftung von Vorstandsmitgliedern für fehlerhafte Ad-hoc-Miteilungen – Besprechung der Infomatec-Urteile 
des BGH, BB 2004, p. 2031, 2032. 
134 Bundesgerichtshof. 
135 RGZ 91, 80, 81. 
136 BGH WM 1982, 1812. 
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“protective law” (Schutzgesetz) has been violated. Generally a “protective  law” is  a law whose aim of 
protection patronizes both the general public as well as an individual.
137 
 
It is traditionally highly debated, as to which legal rules have the character of a “protective law”.
138 Section 
263, 266 Criminal Code (StGB)
139 and sections 400 Stock Corporation Act (AktG)
140, 331 Commercial 
Trading Act (HGB)
141 are approved “protective laws”
142 that are debated in this context.
143 The discussion as 
to whether the new section 37 c WphG is a “protective law”, and thus would create a direct claim against 
Board members for false information below the barrier of scienter,
144 has ended with a negative result. 
Section 37 c WpHG definitely does not have the characteristics of a “protective law”. 
 
c) High Demands on the Plaintiffs who carry the Burden of Proof 
 
The  German  private  liability  system  for  socially  unwanted  corporate  practices  is  quite  weak  and  that 
relatively ineffective. The root for this is that its fundament is the traditional German tort system. 
 
Customarily problematic is the prerequisite of scienter that bases both on claims according to 823 II with 
“protective law” and 826 BGB required. This is typically not easy to prove by the damaged plaintiffs. 
Basically, and in compliance with German civil procedure law, simply denying the accusation would be 
enough for the sued Board member to dismiss the action. This has actually happened in the civil actions after 
the capital market scandals frequently. 
 
Moreover, the claims under sections 823 II and section 826 BGB require a proof of causation. Under the 
German jurisdiction the required causation between damaging conduct and damage is strictly construed.
145 
The unwanted conduct must be “condicio sine qua non” for the occurred loss. Thus, de lege lata causation 
can  only  be  found  in  a  false  ad-hoc  disclosure,  if  the  investment  does  not  have  taken  place  without 
publication of the material data.
146 This indeed is not easy to prove due to the fact that usually diverse factors 
are influencing the investment decision.
147 
 
Most of the court actions were dismissed, because of either the practically impossible proof of scienter or the 




                                                 
137 MüKo-Mertens, § 823, marginal note 162 et sqq. 




142 See also Ryan, Patrick S., "Understanding Director & Officer Liability in Germany for Dissemination of False Information: 
Perspectives from an Outsider". German Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 5, 2003, 456 et sqq. 
143  See  for  details  about  “protective  laws”,  Edelmann,  Hervé,  Haftung  von  Vorstandsmitgliedern  für  fehlerhafte 
Ad-hoc-Miteilungen – Besprechung der Infomatec-Urteile des BGH, BB 2004, p. 2031 et sqq. 
144 Section 37 c WpHG requires “only” grossly negligence. As the standard of care in section 823 II follows the one found in the 
“protective law”, a claim without scienter would have been invented. But, the vast majority of scholars were against this de lege 
ferenda suggestion. See Palandt-Sprau, § 823, marginal note 60. 
145 Palandt-Sprau, § 823, marginal note 53 
146 Palandt-Sprau, § 823, marginal note 60.  
147 To be considered are  for instance the hints of finance consultants and bank employees. 
148 Baums, ZHR 167 (2003), 139, 141. 
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3. Internal Liability of Board Members 
 
According to section 93 I, 116 AktG Board members are liable for a breach of duty of loyalty or fiduciary 
duty that they have on behalf of the corporation. It is the corporation that has the title against the Board 
members. The latter have to compensate for the damage they have caused. This legal claim is the traditional 
German internal liability of both the Board of Management and the Board of Directors. 
 
To  prove  this  claim,  the  court  has  to  be  convinced  that  the  Boards  breached  their  professional  duties. 
Admittedly this it is not easy to accomplish.
149 
 
II. The Situation De Lege Ferenda 
 
The  - present -
150  German  government  has  sketched  out  the  KapInHaG  that might  bring changes  to  the 
WphG. The major change the KapInHaG
151 proposes is a reformed section 37 c WpHG, which creates in a 
quasi general clause a direct claim of shareholders against the members of both the Board of Management 
and the Board of Directors for disseminating false information on the market. Hence, the targets of the 
drafted law are primarily the members of the Boards and are not the public corporation itself. 
 
By doing this, the German corporate liability system is undergoing a fundamental and systematic change. 
Besides the prospected direct claim, the tort law framework will remain, as well as the internal liability 
receivable  from  the  Boards,  which  itself  will  probably  be  reformed  in  the  near  future.
152  Sünner,  as  a 
practicing in-house legal adviser, assesses the proposed direct claim as debris, which is rather based on a 
general economic adverse disposition in current Germany than it is on a well-advised reform act.
153 
 
B. Economic Rationales in Favor and Against a Direct Claim 
 
To examine the optimally designed legal remedy, one primarily has to address the target of the law, i.e. who 
shall be held liable if the representatives of a public corporation are disclosing wrong information. This can 
be either a claim against the corporation itself or a personal and private liability rule against the Boards. The 
question is whether economic theory is revealing, which of the tasks is superior. 
 
I. Creating Incentives to Disseminate less False Information 
 
Again microeconomic price theory allows for a prediction of Board members’ professional behavior.
154 If the 
damaged investor has a direct claim against the active publishing corporate representative to recoup the 
losses that occurred because of the false information, the latter will take more precautions in the disclosure 
                                                 
149 Spindler, Gerald, Persönliche Haftung der Organmitglieder für Falschinformationen des Kapitalmarkts, WM 2004, P. 2089, 2096. 
150 There will be a new election in Germany in September 2005. If the current government will not remain it appears quite likely that 
the drafted KapInHaG will never be enacted, because the new parties that might create the new government (CDU/ FDP) have 
signaled their disapproval of the regulation’s content. 
151  The  draft  of  the  KapInHaG  is  available  at  http://www.wpk.de/pdf/wpk-stellungnahmen_kapinhag-diskussionsentwurf.pdf.  
(Accessed on the 7.8.2005) 
152 See the sketched Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts (UMAG). www.bmj.de (Entwur-
fUMAG.pdf)  
153 Sünner, Eckart, Ungereimtheiten des Entwurfs eines Kapitalmarktinformationshaftungsgesetzes, WM 2004, p. 2460, 2462. 
154 Korobkin, Russel/ Ulen, Thomas, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 
California Law Review, Vol. 88, 2000, also available at http://papers.ssrn.com /paper.taf?abstract_id= 229937, p. 2. 
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process. As the price for excessively imprecise information increases, the manager will disseminate less 
wrong or misleading information so as to avoid liability. So, the reasonable aim of the KapInHaG can be 
reached by creating a personal liability for the company’s insiders. 
 
On  the  other  hand  the  currently  applicable  German  law  is  already  influencing  the  incentives  on  Board 
members. Hence, it has to be considered to assess the impact of the new-implemented direct claim properly. 
As mentioned above, the German corporate law provides in section 93 I, 116 AktG the concept of internal 
liability (Innenhaftung) of managers and supervisors that act against the duties they have in operating on 
behalf of the company. Since the disclosure of false information causes a clear damage to the company, the 
Board members’ behavior will basically cause their internal liability according to section 93 I, 116 AktG. 
Thus, there is an argument that the internal liability is already influencing the manager’s behavior in a 




The conditions and the content of both the direct claim and the internal title are quite similar as they are 
equally related to the identical legally unwanted conduct, which is the false disclosure of material data. The 
damages, which are deducible from the differences of the share prices following the false announcements 
and its discovery, are recoupable under both titles as well as the proof of causation is necessary. But there is 
also a significant discrepancy between the direct claim and the title of the corporation against its Board 
members, which might have an impact on the managers’ incentives. 
 
According to section 112 AktG, actions on behalf of the corporation against the Board of Management 
following section 93 AktG have to be executed by the Supervisory Board and according to section 78 AktG 
and it also has to be filed vice versa.
156 Not astonishingly it is asserted that there is a hazard that Board 
members might not effectively protect the corporation’s interests.
157 According to the saying: ”There’s honor 
among thieves”, one actually has to doubt that every breach of duty of loyalty or of fiduciary duty will be 
pursued seriously. This allegation is fostered by a noteworthiness of Germany’s corporate reality. The fact 
remains that many retiring chairmen of Boards of Managements go over to the Supervisory Board, and 
usually have chosen their successor in the Management Board beforehand. Thus, the relationship between 
the two Boards is  characterized by  multiple dependencies  and personal solidarity. This weak  and often 
criticized aspect in the German corporate governance system
158 is that the possibilities of managerial internal 
liability is not used effectively, because the two mentioned organs are two close to each other, so that the 
necessary control is not occurring.
159 
 
In German as well as in US law, the regulator copes with the former issue and provides a remedy for the 
                                                 
155 Deutsches Aktieninstitut, Stellungnahme für das Bundesministerium der Finanzen zu dem Diskussionsentwurf eines Gesetzes zur 
Verbesserung der Haftung für falsche Kapitalmarktinformationen (Kapitalmarktinformationshaftungsgesetz- KapInHaG). Available 
at www.dai.de (Stellungnahme.pdf), p. 2; Spindler, Gerald, Persönliche Haftung der Organmitglieder für Falschinformationen des 
Kapitalmarkts, WM 2004, P. 2089, 2094. 
156 Wiesner, Georg, Münchener Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrechts, Band 4, Aktiengesellschaft,  p.  154.  
157 Hüffer, Uwe Aktiengesetz,  6
th Edition,  § 147, marginal note 1; Peter O. Mülbert, Empfiehlt es sich das Kapitalmarkt- und Bör-
senrecht neu zu regeln? JZ 2002, p. 826, 835. 
158 See Baums, ZHR 167 (2003), 139, 142. 
159 A detailed survey on the divergences and the deficiencies of the German as well as the US corporate governance systems is 
provided by Schwarz, Günter Christian/ Holland Björn Enron, WorldCom ... und die Corporate-Governance- Discussion, ZIP 2002, 
p. 1661-1672.  
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rather ineffective enforcement of the corporation’s interests. In section 147 AktG the Gesellschafterklage,
160 
i.e. the equivalent of the US derivative suit, is regulated. These specific suits are actions brought by a 
shareholder in the name of the corporation to correct a wrong done to the corporation.
161 As persons who are 
in  control  of  the  corporation  are  unlikely  to  authorize  the  corporation  to  bring  suit  against  themselves 
personally, the Gesellschafterklage
162 or derivative suit permits a shareholder to prosecute these claims on 
behalf of the corporation.
163  
 
As  the  Gesellschafterklage  in  Germany  theoretically  remedies  the  weak  protection  of  corporation’s  and 
therefore eventually shareholder’s interests, this reality is quite sobering. Just as the derivative suit in US law 
the  Gesellschafterklage  is  a  rather  blunt  sword.  Only  very  few  Gesellschafterklagen  are  actually  filed, 
because there are prerequisites to be met (section 147 AktG) that are quite complex and time-consuming:
164 
either the interested shareholders have to effect a shareholders resolution about the issue or the shareholders 
need a minority quorum of at least 10 % of the shareholder equity.
165 Moreover, the minority of shareholders 
face  the  risk  of  paying  the  court  costs  if  the  corporation  eventually  loses  the  action  (see 
section 147 IV AktG). 
 
As the provisions of the Gesellschafterklage are laborious and risky for the shareholders, there is an ongoing 
discussion of reforming it.
166 But de lege lata it is not a successful remedy for the weak protection of 
shareholders’ interests. Hence, the claim of the corporation against its Boards is not an effective tool to deter 
the Board to disseminate false share price relevant information. 
 
Thus, this argument recommends the direct claim of the KapInHaG as a sensible completion of the existing 
but weak internal liability. In the further process of reforming the capital market law one has to trade off the 
effectiveness of the internal liability – especially the Gesellschafterklage – with direct claim, since both 
provide Board members to disclose information more carefully. 
 
II. “Endgame Problems” in Corporate Disclosure Policies 
 
The German corporate scandals reveal that Board members did increasingly provide the capital market with 
false and misleading information especially when “their” corporations were in crisis and the fear of dismissal 
of the employment contracts as well as the loss of managerial reputation was apparent or - in the worst case - 
the corporation itself was close to bankruptcy. This was notably the case in the already mentioned scandals 
of EM.TV, Comroad and Metabox.
167 
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In game theoretical terms, this could be seen as an “endgame problem”:
168 Generally game theory can help to 
explain the strategic behavior of principals and agents in specific situations in business relationships.
169 
These  cooperations  confront  situations  in  which  the  optimal  action  for  the  principal  to  take,  frequently 
depends  on  what  strategy  the  agent  chooses.  The  “endgame  problem”  describes  the  unwinding  of 
cooperation as a repeated game approaches its final round.
170 Usually the principal-agent relationships is 
about to last for a long time so that it is characterized by frequent exchanges between the actors in different 
periods.
171 Hence both parties have the incentive to behave well, as the agent knows that if she appropriates 
the principal, it will retaliate in the next period (tit-for-tat situation).
172 However the principal has no power 
to retaliate in the last round of the game so that the agent lacks the taming constraint and might change her 
strategy and appropriates. Thus the end game problem creates obstacles for the principal in the last period.
173 
 
The application of the “endgame problem” to the German capital market scandals shows that usually Board 
members have an incentive to provide investors with accurate information, because the market would reveal 
falsehood  of  the  information  in  a  later  period  and  then  punish  the  Board  member  and  the  corporation 
severely by selling stocks and spoiling their reputation, bad ratings of rating agencies etc. Vice versa for 
Board members there would also be positive returns awarded for the dissemination of truthful information. 
However, if Board members believe that there probably is no further period to come, or that things are worse 
anyway, usual constraint has vanished and the incentives have changed. The Management might be in good 
faith belief so as to have the entrepreneurial crisis under control. In these circumstances the probability that 
wrong information will be disclosed to hide bad facts or to borrow some time to get over the current crisis is 
increasing. 
 
A direct claim against Board members as it is drafted in the KapInHaG could put into place a counter 
balancing threat in cases of corporate crises that practically triggers the classic “endgame problem”. 
III. The German Advocate Association’s Provisos 
 
The business law committee of the German Advocate Association (Handelsrechtsausschuss des Deutschen 
Anwaltverein) comments upon the proposed direct claim rather critically.
174 
 
1. Legal Title follows the Lost Reliance in the Corporation 
 
The written opinion of the Association points out that the perspective of investors in the disclosure process 
gives hint against the proposed direct claim. More precisely, it states that a direct claim is inferior to the 
traditional  internal  liability,  because  it  cannot  be  justified  with  the  argument  of  “disappointed  investor 
reliance”:  from  the  perspective  of  investors  the  dissemination  of  information  is  a  task  of  the  public 
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corporation itself rather than of the Board member personally. Even though the expertise and the integrity of 
Board  members  occasionally  influence  the  investment  decision  of  financiers,  usually  capital  market 
information is receipted as announced by the public corporation. The Association’s opinion asserts that this 
fact gives reason for the liability of the corporation, which itself should pay for the compensation investors 
can claim, because it also aggregates the investors’ faith. 
 
As the German Advocate Association is holding stakes in the corporate world, it cannot be completely barred 
that the argument is prone to the interests of the mandators, who are practically Board members who act on 
behalf public corporations. Nonetheless, the provided argument is sensible prima facie. In particular it is 
legally accurate, as it seeks to focus on the equity aspect of “disappointed investor reliance”. As traditional 
legal scholarship is concerned with the balance of interests, it also wants to provide legal remedies exactly in 
relationships that are characterized by specific trust.  
 
But – at closer inspection – from the perspective of Law & Economics, which is concerned with the actual 
effects of specific legal rules,
175 the legal title of the investors against the public corporation appears to be 
rather ineffective.
176 In fact, it might be correct that investors lose faith in the corporation itself and think e.g. 
DaimlerChrysler  is  underperforming  the  market  because  the  CEO Mr. Schrempp  frivolously  disclosed 
entrepreneurial targets that could not be accomplished at all. But the legal remedy has to cope with both the 
material losses and the lost faith of investors, which is best accomplished if the CEO will be deterred to 
disclose false information. As already stated, the current German law lacks a rule that effectively deters false 
information so that a direct claim is prevailing. 
 
Considering the actual German jurisdiction, the view on its effects, i.e. specially the incentives it provides, 
reasonably  makes  a  call  for  the  proposed  direct  claim  against  Board  members  for  disclosing  false 
information. 
 
2. Systematic Advantages of Investors compared to other Stakeholders 
 
The direct claim that is proposed by the KapInHaG provides the investors with a systematic advantage 
compared to other stakeholders that are also exposed to false information. For instance, the conditions of 
long-term supply agreements or bank credits are influenced by material data that is disseminated before the 
transaction. The creditors might only conclude the deal because of the information and lose their stake if the 
corporation goes bankrupt or will not be able to recoup their losses, if they - due to the false information – 
granted information that was too positive. 
 
The  German  Advocate  Association  sees  no  justification  for  this  unilateral  advantage  of  the  group  of 
investors.
177 But the opinion of the Association overlooks an important aspect, which actually legitimates the 
mentioned difference among the stakeholders. First, it has to recognize that stakeholders that have concluded 
a deal because of intentionally false information will usually have a claim of rescission on the contract as 
well a title of compensation (see section 123 BGB). Secondly, and even more importantly is the difference 
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between the losses that investors and other stakeholders undergo. The damages of investors are - different 
from the losses of e.g. lessors or lenders – not a zero-sum-game in which one actor gains what the opponent 
looses.
178  The  false  information  causes  inefficiencies  in  the  capital  market,  because  of  lower  investor-
commitment that finally goes far beyond the actual private losses.
179 Thus, from an economic point of view it 





The former arguments prove the advantage of a direct claim against members of the Board. Notwithstanding 
this observation, one has to take into account that a new direction in the German corporate liability system 
will  be  taken.  This  fundamental  change  has  to  be  initiated  cautiously,  because  there  are  various 
interdependencies - such as the reform of the internal liability and the discussion about more severe criminal 
law - with already existing rules, which already influence the Boards behavior.  
 
But still, the direct claim’s clear advantage of instantaneous incentives for Board members is to increase 
precaution in the disclosure process appears striking and call for the implementation of the new rule. 
 
C. Approaching the Optimal Liability Regime 
 
It  is  notable  that  the  liability  rule  certainly  yields  the  Board  members’  accountability  for  purposeful 
dissemination of false information. To scrutinize in the following is the impact of regulation on Board 
members’ behavior that is below the notion of scienter. 
 
An  application  of  the  Nirvana-approach
180  is  to  research  for  the superior  remedy  for  socially  unwanted 
conditions by comparing the social costs that occur if the market is unregulated and when it is regulated. 
 
 As  could  be  pointed  out,  if  the  capital  market  is  under-regulated,  there  are  social  costs  that  comprise 
investors’ private damages and losses due to increased market inefficiencies, as financiers will abstain from 
trading.
181 On the other hand, a liability rule creates also costs that need to be balanced against the former. 
These costs include administrative costs, i.e. the costs of putting the case through the legal system and the 
costs of avoiding damages, i.e. reducing the activity level of the risky conduct.
182 Hence, the costs of a 
liability  rule  include  the  expenses  that  Boards  incur  to  avoid  false  announcements  and  the  market 
inefficiencies that occur, because there will also be less valuable information available on the market to 
assess worthwhile investments. 
 
A prerequisite for the necessary Cost-Benefit-Analysis is to design the liability rule that minimizes the social 
costs that it generates.
183 An essential aspect for this task is which standard of accountability is optimal to 
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pursue  the  goal  of  balanced  deterrence  and  entrepreneurial  freedom  of  decision-making  in  disclosure 
policies. To pinpoint the accurate level of effort that managers should invest to provide the market with 
correct information about the company’s performance one has to scrutinize the scale of fault or standard of 
due care, which is set in the liability rule. 
 
On the one hand, a legal mechanism that deters effectively from disclosing false corporate data is necessary. 
But the risk that information about the company’s prospects will turn out incorrect is the other side of the 
coin of the expected benefits related to any potentially profitable investment. Thus, it is part of the matter 
that the investors also share a fraction of this risk. Therefore the peril that entrepreneurial prognoses will be 




I. The Effects of a Strict Liability Rule 
 
Under a strict liability rule the Board members would have to pay monetary damages in every case the ex 




Rational  shareholders  will  only  sue  a  Board  member  if  the  given  information,  e.g.  the  prospected 
profitability of an M&A-transaction, will ex post turnout to be incorrect. As a result the corporate decision-
makers would bear all downside risk that material prognoses imply, whereas shareholders are liberated of 
any of its negative consequences. 
 
The rule would increase the costs of disseminating wrong information for Board members significantly. 
Hence, the entrepreneurial decision-makers would give more effort to avoid liability. The incentive not to 
pay  for  the  shareholders’  losses  would  increase  the  level  of  precaution  Boards  take  to  evade  wrong 
information. The effects are twofold:  
 
Firstly,  this  is  boosting  information  cost  since  the  Board  members  will  hire  business  consultants,  legal 
advisers or accountants to double-check on the entrepreneurial prognoses that will be published. Moreover, 
they will insure the risk of being held liable with a costly D&O-insurance.
186 Since the shareholders as the 
residual  owners  of  the  corporation  are  entitled  to  all  the  net  profits  of  the  enterprise,  the  former  will 
eventually bear the increased information cost and lose profits.  
 
Second, besides the negative effects on the information cost there is an even more severe inefficiency arising 
from a strict liability regime. The decision-makers would become risk averse. They would be deterred from 
taking  potentially  desirable  risks.  Assuming  investors  that  are  risk  neutral  because  they  diversify  their 
portfolio, they don’t want too conservative managers. The excessive precaution triggers an inefficient level 
of risk that impedes the disclosure of information, which is necessary for the accurate evaluation of the 
corporation’s share price. Therefore the share price will have a discount, because of the lack of knowledge 
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potential investors will have about the company’s prospects.
187 
 
Moreover, the strict liability rule creates no incentive for the investors to make any efforts to valuate the 
market  information  on  their  own.
188  Since  financiers  have  a  title  against  the  Board  member  if  the 
announcement is false they might take information for granted and base their investment-decision on it, 
which is obviously exaggerating or suspiciously overoptimistically describing the company’s prospects. This 
indeed yields also suboptimal allocations of resources in capital markets, even though a financier could 
attenuate the most obvious false statements at low costs. 
 
A strict liability rule appears to be quite inefficient and therefore is not the instrument to minimize the costs 
of regulation. 
 
II. The Impact of a Negligence Rule 
 
A negligence rule would disburden Board members from the accountability of compensation when they can 
prove the adoption of the standard of due care, which has to be defined by the law.
189 
 
Theoretically a negligence rule comprises the optimal remedy for the obstacles with false information in 
capital markets. The decision-makers would adopt the level of precaution in the disclosure process that is 
necessary to avoid liability. Potential investors would know that they could rely on the information as far as 
the negligence standard goes.
190 If non-diversified investors are risk averse, they have the incentive to control 
the information further at their own expenses. This is because financiers know that the decision-makers will 
not be held liable if they comply with the standard of due care. 
 
In general, one can assert that the higher the potential private damages and market detriments are, the more 
justified information cost, such as expenses for legal opinions and business consulting are. 
 
But to get closer to the point at issue, the crucial prerequisites of a negligence rule have to be observed: the 
efficiency of a negligence rule depends on two suppositions, which are not easy to accomplish. Thus, they 
account for obstacles in its practical application. 
 
First, the legal system, i.e. the lawmaker and the courts, has to define the ideal level of precaution. Abstractly 
expressed, the law has to locate the point at which the marginal costs of the disclosure process, i.e. the costs 
of verification of specific information by Board members equal the marginal damages that false information 
will generate. The latter are the private investor losses and the negative effects on the economic growth due 
to a diminishing capital market. Since these costs and damages are very difficult to compute in practice, it 
appears to be a challenging venture to define the efficient level of due care. 
 
Secondly, the negligence rule requires to verify ex post whether managers did comply with the standard of 
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due care. Since this examination will occur only after damage is to deplore, there is a basic insight of the 
analyses  of  Law  and  Behavioral  Science  that  provides  an  argument,  which  reveals  the  systematic 
defectiveness of the negligence standard to solve the problem of false information in capital markets. 
 
The  phenomenon  of  the  hindsight  bias  implies  that  the  probability  of  an  incident  to  occur  will  be 
overestimated in a subsequent evaluation of a process.
191 Consequently the likelihood that a specific event 
would happen will appear higher if the event actually did happen. 
 
If this empirically tested and found quite robust bias of human decision-making is adapted to a trial situation, 
the Boards will be convicted of being negligent more often than the negligence standard did arrange for and 
than it’s members deserve it.
192 The judges or juries will decide the case while knowing that the predicted 
gain or the anticipated successful acquisition of a competitor that was disclosed in the announcement did not 
eventuate. Even though the failure might have been quite unpredictable and the action was economically 
right-minded ex ante, the judgment will be biased by the only fact that the incident occurred. Thus, the 
hindsight bias will make the decision-maker even more risk averse,
193 which is eventually unfavorable for 
shareholders’ pursuit to amend the performance of their investment. 
 
The outcome of the hindsight bias is that the basically sensible negligence regime will be transformed in a 
“quasi- strict liability” standard, which has the outbalanced disadvantages described above.  
 
Hence,  a  pure  negligence  standard  appears  not  to  be  the  first  best  solution  to  minimize  the  costs  of  a 
regulated capital market. 
 
III. Applying Interpretations of the Business Judgment Rule 
 
Neither a strict liability- nor a negligence rule could be identified as the instrument to cope with false 
information in German capital markets efficiently. 
 
Since in the US, the Business Judgment Rule (BJR) is a traditional as well as controversial instrument in 




This analysis will not deeply assess the various arguments in favor and against the BJR, which Stout
195 as 
well as Branson
196 have already compiled accurately. It will rather take the customary applied interpretations 
of the BJR in US corporate law to utilize them for the German capital market law. 
 
Basically, in US law the BJR is a legal instrument that provides protection for corporate decision-makers not 
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to be held personal accountable for mistakes in business ruling. It comprises a standard that shall liberate the 
Board from not taking objectively necessary entrepreneurial decisions, because of the threat of damaged 
shareholder’s lawsuits. It permits a wide leeway for corporate decision-makers to publish information about 
the company’s performance that finally might turn out to be wrong, so that also the disseminated information 
itself will be false ex post. It is different from a negligence rule with a low standard of due care, because it 
basically dos not define a standard at all, except the undisputable damnation of self-dealing and insider 
trading.  
 
As categorized by Bainbridge,
197 the US corporate law broadly interprets two different concepts of BJRs. 
The perceptions are divergent in their standard of defining the level of fault that can be judged by the 
court.
198 Thus, these two concepts will be applied to the obstacles of false information in capital markets to 
assess their impact on corporate disclosure processes.  
 
1. The Abstention Doctrine 
 
The more traditional application of the standard is merely a rule of abstention. That means, courts will not 
assess the entrepreneurial decision of the Board members. The reason behind this is the insight that “judges 
are not business experts”
199 and the knowledge about the prejudice in the assessment of business decisions 
following the above-mentioned hindsight bias.
200  
 
A US court stated in a significant judgment: “By these thoughts we do not mean to say that we have decided 
that the decision of the directors was a correct one. That is beyond our jurisdiction and ability. We are merely 
saying that the decision is one properly before directors and the motives alleged in the amended complaint 
showed no fraud, illegality or conflict of interest in their making of that decision.”
201  
 
Hence, courts restrain themselves from assessing the decision except for fraud, illegality and an obvious 
conflict of interests. Consequentially, there is no standard of due care that could be applied to consider the 
merits of the business decision and therefore coevally the effort, which is made to verify disseminated capital 
market information. 
 
Following  this  definition  of  the  BJR  the  professional  behavior  of  the  Board  members  will  be  mostly 
uncontrolled by a legal mechanism. This absence of legal monitoring is influencing the disclosure process in 
different ways: 
 
Since courts only will check whether in the disclosure process is intentionally self-dealing involved, the 
worst and most damaging behavior of Board member will be deterred. In addition to that one can argue that 
the hindsight bias problem is solved.  
 
But keeping in mind the severe asymmetry of information that weakens the position of investors by making 
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them dependent on the published news, there is a problem with the BJR as abstention doctrine. It reduces the 
information costs for Board members significantly and provides an incentive to disclose information rather 
unaudited. They might reject to consider facts, which are objectively necessary to assess the whole risk of a 
specific business operation properly and therefore lead to false information that is available to the capital 
market. 
 
Moreover, once more analyses of Law and Behavioral Science indicate that the former risk of an inefficient 
influence  of  false  information  is  exacerbating  under  the  abstention  doctrine.  There  are  doubts  that  the 
mentioned  content  is  pinpointing  the  optimal  balance  of  the  two  important  issues,  which  have  to  be 
combined in the legal rule: it shall effectively deter the management not to make announcements frivolously 
but at the same time it has to make sure that the necessary information will be disseminated courageously 
and at the perfect time.
202 
 
As mentioned, people in general - and corporate managers especially -, are biased to be over-optimistic, 
systematically underestimating risks and are unaware of their clear cognitive limitations.
203 Experiments 
reveal that people in general overestimate their skills in - and their contribution to - courses of action they are 
concerned  with  (“above  average  effect”).
204  The  over-optimism-bias  makes  corporate  decision-makers 
announce objectively to fast and too less revised venturesome maneuvers, which might have required a more 
careful  assessment  of  available  data.
205  Hence,  the  disclosure  process  is  executed  by  too  self-confident 
decision-makers, which will lead to too frivolously published announcements. 
 
As a result, the abstention doctrine is quite inefficient concerning the obstacles with false capital market 
information.  
 
2. “Process Monitoring Standard of Gross Negligence” 
 
Compared  to  the  abstention  doctrine  a  softer  interpretation  of  the  BJR  is  practically  applied,  too.  This 
understanding of the rule is allows the court a deeper analysis of the decision.  
 
But, under this notion of the BJR the courts still do not measure, weigh or quantify the board’s decisions, 
judges will not even decide if the ruling is reasonable in its context. However, under this interpretation 
“directors’ decisions will be respected by courts unless the directors are self interested or lack independence 
relative to the decision, do not act in good faith, act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational 
business purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process that includes the failure to consider 
all material facts reasonably available”.
206 
 
The application of this excerpt to the problem of false information in capital markets reveals that the criteria 
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of assessment are different from the ones under the abstention doctrine. The courts will apply a standard of 
due care according to the process of disclosure.
207 Even though the information will turn out objectively 
wrong in the trial, this fact alone will not lead to the liability of the Boards, if the process to gather the 
information itself was not grossly negligent.  
 
Hence, there are two aspects to adhere. The information itself will not be – but the process to attain it is 
going to be assessed by courts. Secondly, the standard to evaluate the procedure will be “gross negligence”. 
As  a  consequence,  if  members  of  the  Board  are  grossly  negligent  not  using  data  or  material  that  was 
reasonably available in the disclosure process they will be held liable. 
 
What are the possible consequences for the actual behavior of corporate decision-makers if this interpretation 
of the Business Judgment Rule is applied to information disclosure procedures in the German capital market? 
 
The threat of over deterrence is banished, because the decision-makers are allowed to make mistakes in their 
rulings without the fear of being sued by shareholders. In the borderlines of looting behavior, i.e. self-dealing 
even  objectively  wrong  information  can  be  published.  This  indeed  bears  a  hazard  of  frivolous  and 
overoptimistic announcements and private losses of investors relying on false information. But at the same 
time it allows the Board to take risks that are in the interests of a risk neutral shareholder.  
 
To reduce the risk of frivolous and overoptimistic disclosure of information, under this interpretation of the 
Business Judgment Rule the courts will assess the method the information was evaluated. Therefore, Board 
members will know that they are free in their business decisions but will have to utilize the “reasonably 
available” material data. This creates an incentive to take a reasonable level of precaution while processing 
the information that is to announce to the public. 
 
But, to assure that in hindsight not too many data and materials appear “reasonably available” the standard of 
assessment must not be pure negligence. It has to be gross negligence so that the practical circumstances of 
time constraint and pressure under which the decision-makers are operating are taken into account. Thus, 
Board  members  are  allowed  to  make  mistakes  in  their  day-to-day  appraisal  of  entrepreneurial  future 
prospects.  If  their  estimation  was  false,  courts  will  ask  for  the  underlying data  that  was  utilized  in the 
disclosure policy. 
 
Thus, the “process-monitoring standard of gross negligence” is the first best solution and minimizes the costs 
of a regulated market. 
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§ 5. Conclusions 
 
Recent German financial scandals are evoked by false capital market information that was intentionally or 
frivolously disseminated by Board members of public corporations. The incentives to approve this disclosure 
policy are based on structural, systematic and motivational grounds. 
 
The false material data are causing a divergence between the corporation’s discounted intrinsic value and its 
present market value. When the market recognizes the misdirection, the share price will abruptly downswing. 
The damages occur on the private sector as shareholders face major losses and on the public sector, because 
of increased and excessive inefficiencies in the capital market. 
 
According to the theory of regulation, an intervention of the lawmaker is indicated when the damages are 
based on market failures. False information derogate the efficient allocation of funds and impede enhanced 
Pareto optimality, because of obstacles with asymmetric information, negative externalities as well as free 
riding-behavior by competitors. Thus, the apparent market failures call for regulation. 
 
Following the aim of maximizing social welfare, regulation is only legitimate when its total costs are below 
the damages without state intervention. Besides the damages in the free market, the provision of this Cost-
Benefit-Analysis is an optimal liability rule that minimizes the total costs of the regulated market.  
 
The current German capital market law is not complying with this requirement. The traditional regime of the 
corporation’s  external  liability  combined  with  the  internal  liability  is  – de  lege  lata -  ineffective.  The 
KapInHaG  with  its  proposed  direct  claim  of  investors  against  Board  members  is  prevailing,  especially 
because of the implementation of clear as well as straight incentives to decision-makers. 
 
However, by proposing the standard of due care of “gross negligence” the KapInHaG will not be efficient 
and remains amendable. Creating a standard of due care that allows courts to scrutinize the objective merits 
of the capital market information - except outstanding circumstances as intentional self-dealing – will over 
deter  Board  members.  To  pinpoint  the  optimal  standard  of  fault,  the  US’  Business  Judgment  Rule  is 
promising  also  for  German  capital  markets.  But  the  abstention  doctrine  would  stay  below  the  optimal 
threshold and therefore is under deterring. It increases the probability of major investor losses and - in the 
long run - of inefficient capital markets, because of lower commitments of discouraged investors. The first 
best solution is the “process-monitoring standard of gross negligence”.  
 
This  standard  of  “process-monitoring  standard  of  gross  negligence”  will  not  allow  courts  to  assess  the 
sensibility of a false capital market information in an ex post evaluation. But it will allow the analysis, 
whether the disclosure process was not influenced by grossly negligent not considering necessary data. 
 
A legal rule that comprises the former standard of fault of a moderate Business Judgment Rule appears to be 
a close approximation of the optimal answer to this analysis. 
 
 
47 MESCHKOWSKI: THE ECONOMICS OF D&O LIABILITY FOR FALSE INFORMATION IN GERM





Achleitner, Ann-Kristin/  
Wollmert, Peter 
   
Stock Options, Handelsblatt Bücher, Finanzwirtschaft, 
Gesellschaftsrecht,  Bilanzierung,  Steuerrecht,  Arbeits-
recht,  Unternehmensbewertung,  ed.  Wollmert,  Peter, 
2. Edition, Stuttgart 2002. 
 
Akerlof, George A.  
 
   
The  Market  for  ‘Lemons:’  Quality  Uncertainty  and 
the Market Mechanism, 84. Q. J. Econ. 488 (1970). 
 
Baird, Douglas G./ 
Gertner, Robert H./ 
Picker, Randal C. 
   




   
Mittelständische  Unternehmen  und  Börse – Eine 
rechtsvergleichende Betrachtung, Festschrift für Ernst-




   
Changing  Patterns  of  Corporate  Disclosure  in 
Continental  Europe:  the  Example  of  Germany, 
European  Corporate  Governance  Institute,  ECGI 
Working Paper Series in Law, October 2002. 
 
Baums, Theodor 
   
Haftung  wegen  Falschinformationen  des  Sekundär-
marktes, ZHR 167 (2003), p. 139-192. 
 
Bicchieri, Cristina 
   
Rationality  and  Coordination,  Cambridge  University 
Press, 1993. 
 
Black, Bernard S. 
   
The  Legal  and  Institutional  Preconditions  For  Strong 
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781, 2000-2001. 
 
Branson, Douglas M.  
 
   
"The Rule That Isn' t a Rule - The Business Judgment 
Rule", http://ssrn.com/abstract=346080, 2002, p. 1-21. 
 
Buchta, Jens 
   
Die Haftung des Vorstands einer Aktiengesellschaft –
aktuelle  Entwicklungen  in  Gesetzgebung  und  Recht-
sprechung (Teil II), DStR 2003, p. 740-745. 
 
Bungert, Hartwin 
   
Gesellschaftsrecht  in  den  USA,  Eine  Einführung  mit 
vergleichenden Tabellen, 3. Edition, Frankfurt, 2003. 
 
Cooter, Robert/ Ulen, Thomas 
   
Law  &  Economics,  4
th  International  Edition,  Boston, 
San Francisco, New York, 2004. 
49 MESCHKOWSKI: THE ECONOMICS OF D&O LIABILITY FOR FALSE INFORMATION IN GERM




   
Information  and  Efficiency:  Another  View  Point, 
Journal of Law and Economics, Issue 12, 1969, p. 1-22. 
 
Edelmann, Hervé  
   
Haftung  von  Vorstandsmitgliedern  für  fehlerhafte 
Ad-hoc-Miteilungen – Besprechung  der  Infoma-
tec-Urteile des BGH, BB 2004, p. 2031-2033. 
 
Escher-Weingart, Christina/  
Lägeler, Alexander/  
Eppinger, Christoph  
   
Schadenersatzanspruch,  Schadensart  und  Schadensbe-
rechnung gem. §§ 37 b, c WPhG, WM 2004, p. 1845-
1896. 
 
Fama, Eugene F./  
Jensen, Michael C./  
Roll, Richard 
 
   
The Adjustment of Stock Prices To New Information, 
International  Economic  Review,  Vol.  10,  February, 
1969;  Reprinted  in  Investment  Management:  Some 
Readings,  J.  Lorie  and  R.  Brealey,  eds.,  Praeger 
Publishers, 1972; and Strategic Issues in Finance, Keith 




   
The Legal Regulation of the Self-Serving Bias, Boston 
University  School  of  Law,  Working  Paper  Series, 
Public Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 02/07. 
 
Feddersen, Dieter/ Pohl, Marcus 
   
Die  Praxis  der  Mitarbeiterbeteiligung  seit  Einführung 
des KonTraG, AG 2001, p. 26-33. 
 
Fleischer, Holger 
   




   
Zur deliktsrechtlichen Haftung der Vorstandsmitglieder 
für  falsche  Ad-hoc-Mitteilungen – Zugleich  eine  Be-
sprechung  der  Infomatec-Entscheidungen  des  BGH 




   
Verhandlungen  Des  Vierundsechzigsten  Deutschen 
Juristentages,  Berlin  2002,  Band  I,  Gutachten,  Mün-
chen, 2002. 
 
Fox,  Merrit  B./  Morck,  Randall/ 
Yeung, Bernard/ Durnev, Artyom 
   
Law,  Share  Price  Accuracy,  And  Economic 
Performance:  The  New  Evidence,  Michigan  Law 
Review, Dec 2003, Vol. 103 Issue 3, p. 331-387. 
 
Gerber, Olaf 
   
Die  Haftung  für  unrichtige  Kapitalmarktinformatio-
nen – Zugleich  eine  Besprechung  der 
BGH-Entscheidungen  vom  19.07.2004  „Infomatec“, 
50 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2006,  Paper 2
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2006/iss1/art2Bibliography  -51 
DStR 2004, p. 1793-1798. 
 
Gilson, Ronald J./  
Kraakman, Reinier  
   
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years 
Later:  The  Hindsight  Bias,  Columbia  Law  and 
Economics Working Paper No. 240; Stanford Law and 
Economics Olin Working Paper No. 270; Harvard Law 
and Economics Disc. Paper No. 446. 
 
Gordon, Jeffrey N. 
   
What Enron Means for the Management and Control of 
the  Modern  Business  Corporation:  Some  Initial 
Reflections,  Univ.  of  Chicago  Law  Review,  Volume 
69, Summer 2002, Number 3. 
 
Gordon, Jeffrey N.  
   
An  International  Relations  Perspective  on  the 
Convergence  of  Corporate  Governance:  German 
Shareholder  Capitalism  and  the  European  Corporate 
Governance  Institute  (ECGI)  European  Union,  1990-
2000.  ECGI -  Law  Working  Paper  No.  06/2003; 
Harvard  Law  and  Economics  Discussion  Paper  No. 
406. 
 
Grossman, Sanford J. 
   
On  the  Impossibility  of  Informationally  Efficient 
Markets,  University  of  Pennsylvania  -  Finance 
Department;  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research 
(NBER), December 1980, NBER Working Paper No. 
R0121. 
 
Hamilton, Robert W. 
   
The Law of Corporations – In A Nutshell -, West‘s Law 




   
Comparison  Among  Firms:  (When)  Do  They  Justify 




   
Kapitalgesellschaftsrecht, 4. Auflage, Köln, 2003. 
 
Holzborn,  Timo/  Foelsch,  Eber-
hard 
   
Schadenersatzpflichten  von  Aktiengesellschaften  und 
deren Management bei Anlegerverlusten, NJW 2003, p. 
932-940. 
 
Hopt, Klaus/ Voigt, Hans- 
Christoph 
   
Prospekt-  und  Kapitalmarktinformationshaftung  –
 Recht  und  Reform  in  der  Europäischen  Union,  der 
Schweiz und den USA -, WM 2004, p. 1801-1844. 
 
Hüffer, Uwe 
   
Aktiengesetz, Beck’sche Kurzkommentare, 6. Edition, 
51 MESCHKOWSKI: THE ECONOMICS OF D&O LIABILITY FOR FALSE INFORMATION IN GERM
Produced by bepress.com, 2011-52        Bibliography 
München, 2004. 
 
Jennings,  Richard  W./  Marsh, 
Harold,  Jr./  Coffee,  John  C.,  Jr./ 
Seligman, Joel 
   
Securities  Regulation,  Cases  and  Materials,  Eighth 
Edition, New York, 1998. 
 
Jensen, Michael C./ 
Meckling, William H.  
   
Theory  of  the  Firm:  Managerial  Behavior,  Agency 
Costs  and  Ownership  Structure,  Journal  of  Financial 
Economics,  October,  1976,  V.  3,  No.  4,  p.  305-360. 
Also reprinted in Michael C. Jensen, A Theory of the 
Firm: Governance, Residual Claims and Organizational 
Forms (Harvard University Press, December 2000). 
 
Kessler, Manfred/ Sauter, Thomas 
   
Handbuch  Stock  Options,  Rechtliche,  steuerliche  und 




   
Persönliche  Organhaftung  für  Falschinformation  des 
Kapitalmarkts – Anlegerschutz  durch  Systembruch?, 
DStR 2003, p. 1982-1990. 
 
Kitch, Edmund W. 
   
Regulation  of  the  Securities  Market,  File  5660, 
Bouckaert,  Boudewijn  and  De  Geest,  Gerrit  (eds.), 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume II. Civil 
Law and Economics, Cheltenham, 2000, p. 813-836. 
 
Köhler,  Annette/  Meyer,  Stepha-
nie/ Mauelshagen, Jan 
   
Umsetzungsstand  des  10-Punkte-Plans  der  Bundesre-
gierung zur Stärkung des Anlegerschutzes und der Un-
ternehmensintegrität, BB 2004, p. 2623-2631. 
 
Korobkin, Russel/ Ulen, Thomas 
 
   
Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality 
Assumption from Law and Economics, California Law 
Review, Vol. 88, 2000. 
 
Leisch, Franz Clemens 
   
Vorstandshaftung  für  falsche  Ad-hoc-Mitteilungen  –
 ein  höchstrichterlicher  Beitrag  zur  Stärkung  des  Fi-
nanzplatzes Deutschland, ZIP 2004, p. 1573-1580. 
 
Lenenbach, Markus 
   
Kapitalmarkt-  und  Börsenrecht,  Praxislehrbuch  Wirt-
schaftsrecht, Köln, 2002. 
 
Loss, Louis/  
Seligman, Joel 
   
Fundamentals  of  Securities  Regulation,  4
th  Edition, 
New York, 2004. 
 
Mankiw, Gregory N. 
   
Grundzüge  der  Volkswirtschaftslehre,  Principles  of 
Economics Third Edition, Stuttgart, 2004. 
52 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2006,  Paper 2
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2006/iss1/art2Bibliography  -53 
 
Maul, Silja 
   
Verantwortlichkeit  der  Organmitglieder  – Ent-




   




   
Unternehmenspublizität:  Offenlegung  von  Unterneh-




   
Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, 
Band 5, Schuldrecht, Besonderer Teil III, §§ 705-853 
BGB  Partnerschaftsgesellschaftsgesetz,  Produkthaf-
tungsgesetz, München, 1997. 
 
Mülbert, Peter O. 
   
Empfiehlt es sich, das Kapitalmarkt- und Börsenrecht 
neu zu regeln?, JZ 2002, p. 826-837. 
 
Müller, Mario 
   
Die  zweite  Supermacht,  Frankfurter  Rundschau, 
19.7.2003, p.12. 
 
Ostrowski,  Markus/  Sommerhäu-
ser, Hendrik 
   
Wirtschaftsprüfung und Going Public – Eine explorati-
ve Studie über Dienstleistungen bei Wirtschaftsprüfern 
bei  Börseneinführungen,  in:  Die  Wirtschaftsprüfung, 
Issue 19/2000, p. 961-970.  
 
Palandt, Otto 
   
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 64. Auflage, München, 2005. 
(cited: Sprau, Hartwig) 
 
Rachlinski, Jeffrey J. 
   
A  Positive  Psychological  Theory  of  Judging  in 
Hindsight, 65 U. Ch. L. Rev. 1998, p. 571-625. 
 
Ribstein, Larry Edward  
 
   
"Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: 
A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002". Journal 
of Corporation Law, Vol. 28, No. 1. 
 
Röhricht, Volker 
   
Gesellschaftsrecht  in  der  Diskussion  2004,  Jahresta-
gung der Gesellschaftlichen Vereinigung (VGR), Köln, 
2005. 
 
Rössner,  Michael-Christian/  Bol-
kart, Johannes 
   
Rechtliche und verfahrenstaktische Analyse des Vorge-
hens  geschädigter  Anleger  bei  fehlerhaften  Unterneh-
mensmeldungen, WM 2003, p. 953-960. 
     
53 MESCHKOWSKI: THE ECONOMICS OF D&O LIABILITY FOR FALSE INFORMATION IN GERM
Produced by bepress.com, 2011-54        Bibliography 
Ryan, Patrick S.  Understanding Director & Officer Liability in Germany 
For  Dissemination  of  False  Information:  Perspectives 
From An Outsider, German Law Journal Vol. 04 No. 
05 2003, p.439-475. 
 
Schäfer, Hans-Bernd 
   
Tort  Law:  General,  File  3000,  Bouckaert,  Boudewijn 
and De Geest, Gerrit (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics,  Volume  II.  Civil  Law  and  Economics, 




   
Strict  Liability  versus  Negligence,  Bouckaert, 
Boudewijn and De Geest, Gerrit (eds.), Encyclopedia of 
Law  and  Economics,  Volume  II.  Civil  Law  and 
Economics , Cheltenham, 2000, p. 597-622. 
 
Schäfer, Hans-Bernd/ Ott Claus 
   
Lehrbuch der ökonomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts, 3. 
Auflage, Berlin , Heidelberg, New York, 2000. 
 
Schwark, Eberhard 
   
Kapitalmarktbezogene Informationshaftung, Festschrift 
für  Walther  Hadding  zum  70.  Geburtstag  am 
8.Mai 2004, p. 1116-1138, Berlin, 2004. 
 
Schwarz,  Günter  Christian/  Hol-
land Björn 
   
Enron,  WorldCom  ...  und  die  Corporate-Governance- 
Discussion, ZIP 2002, p. 1661-1672. 
 
Semler,  Johannes/  Gittermann, 
Stephan 
   
Persönliche  Haftung  der  Organmitglieder  für  Fehlin-
formationen des Kapitalmarktes – zeigt das KapInHaG 
den richtigen Weg?, NZG 2004, p. 1081-1128. 
 
Semmer, Philipp 
   
Repricing – Die  nachträgliche  Modifikation  von  Akti-




   
Persönliche Haftung der Organmitglieder für Falschin-
formationen des Kapitalmarktes – de lege lata und de 
lege ferenda -, WM 2004, p. 2089-2136. 
 
Stout, Lynn A.  
 
   
"In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral 
Defense  of  Smith  v.  Van  Gorkom  and  the  Business 
Judgment Rule" (September 27, 2001). UCLA, School 




   
Ungereimtheiten  des  Entwurfs  eines  Kapitalmarktin-
formationshaftungsgesetzes, WM 2004, p. 2460-2463. 
     
54 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2006,  Paper 2
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2006/iss1/art2Bibliography  -55 
Turiaux, André/  
Knigge, Dagmar 
 
Vorstandshaftung ohne Grenzen? – Rechtssichere Vor-
stands-  und  Unternehmensorganisation  als  Instrument 
der Risikominimierung, DB 2004, p. 2199-2207. 
 
Van den Steen, Eric 
   
Skill or Luck? Biases of Rational Agents, MIT Sloan 




   
Deutsches Aktieninstitut, Stellungnahme für das  
Bundesministerium der Finanzen zu dem Diskussions-
entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Verbesserung der Haftung 
für  falsche  Kapitalmarktinformatio-
nen(Kapitalmarktinformationshaftungsgesetz-  KapIn-
HaG). Available at www.dai.de (Stellungnahme.pdf). 
 
w/o editor 
   
Stellungnahme des Deutschen Anwaltvereins durch den 
Handelsrechtsausschuss zum Diskussionsentwurf eines 
Kapitalmarktinformationshaftungsgesetzes  (KapIn-
HaG),  Stellungnahme  Nr.  49/04,  November  2004. 
Available  at  http://www. 




   
BMF: Diskussionsentwurf eines Gesetzes zur Verbesse-
rung der Haftung für falsche Kapitalmarktinformation 
(Kapitalmarktinformationshaftungsgesetz  –  KapIn-
HaG), NZG 2004, p. 1042-1051. 
 
Wiesner, Georg  
 
   
Münchener Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrechts, Band 4, 
Aktiengesellschaft, 2. Edition, München, 1999. 
 
Wurgler, Jeffrey  
 
   
Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital, NYU 
Stern  School  of  Business;  National  Bureau  of 
Economic  Research  (NBER),  July  1999,  Yale  IFC 
Working Paper No. 99-08. 
 
Yermack, David 
   
Good  Timing:  CEO  Stock  Option  Awards  and 
Company  News  Announcements,  J.  of  Finance,  June 




   
Beck’sches Handbuch der AG – mit KGaA - Gesell-
schaftsrecht – Steuerrecht – Börsengang, Ed. Welf Mül-
ler, Thomas Rödder, München, 2004. 
 
55 MESCHKOWSKI: THE ECONOMICS OF D&O LIABILITY FOR FALSE INFORMATION IN GERM
Produced by bepress.com, 2011